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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines energy security in Europe, through a focused case study of the
German energy policy known as Energiewende, or “energy transition.” The subject of
energy policy and security in Europe has moved to the forefront of debate in recent years.
Germany in particular has embraced a radical energy policy that aspires toward a low
carbon, fully energy independent industrial economy by 2050. From an analysis of
Germany’s Energiewende, this thesis seeks to extrapolate insights that can be applied to
the debate of European energy dependency, environmental impacts, and their economic
considerations. Understanding the implications of Germany’s energy policy, both
economically and defensively, will enable EU member states to consider their own
domestic energy policies as well as EU-wide climate and energy initiatives. This thesis
concludes with an analysis of the impacts Germany’s energy policy is likely to yield upon
fellow EU member states, as well as the future of energy security in Europe.
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INTRODUCTION

The defining dilemma of the latter half of the twenty-first century will be centered
on energy. Transitioning away from the world’s overwhelming dependence on fossil
fuels too quickly could prove economically and geopolitically disastrous. Making the
transition too slowly, conversely, could be equally problematic for the future. The
precipice of a new era of energy sourcing, security, and policy is slowly beginning to
unfold. Nations across North America, Europe, and Asia are beginning to seek and
consider alternative energy sources, as an energy dilemma appears imminent. As the
world begins to confront this energy dilemma, tensions will develop, revealing a complex
and often contradictory nature of energy and security. These tensions include: market-led
versus policy-led initiatives, carbon-based fuels versus renewable energy sources, and
foreign reliance versus energy independence. Today, some countries have started to
confront these tensions, as the looming energy dilemma has already begun to emerge.
Across the world, nations are beginning to seek alternative sources of energy in the form
of renewables. The world’s total electricity production from renewable energy sources
has been on a steady rise since 1990.1 As of 2015, the total global production of
electricity via renewable energy sources peaked at 1.43 trillion kilowatt hours.2 Yet
despite notable strides in global electricity production via renewable energy sources,
reliance on carbon-based fuels continues to grow. While the Renewables 2016 Global

1

“Electricity Production From Renewable Sources, Excluding Hydroelectric (kWh),”
The World Bank, December 8, 2017,
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EG.ELC.RNWX.KH.
2
Ibid.
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Status Report revealed record breaking levels of renewable energy production, the BP
2016 Statistical Review revealed new global heights for fossil fuel consumption.3 This
seeming contradiction between a growth in renewable energy sources and a continued
rise in hydrocarbons is where the world finds itself today, as countries continue to
navigate global energy markets still favoring carbon-based fuels, while crafting domestic
energy policies with sights set on a new era of renewable energy dependence.
As nations begin to confront this new era of energy policy and security, so too
will defense and foreign policies undergo rapid transformations. Current dependence on
carbon-based fuels is not only a climate consideration, but a geopolitical one as well.
Nations with limited domestic energy infrastructure and a vast reliance on foreign
imports will likely remain geopolitically disadvantaged. Thus, transformations in energy
sources, policies, and providers will undoubtedly alter the international landscape.
Nowhere is this a more relevant case study than in Europe today. Despite recent policy
shifts, much of the EU remains dependent on foreign imports for a vast percentage of its
energy needs, with no foreseeable long-term solution for much of the region. Bulgaria,
Estonia, Finland, and Latvia import 100 percent of all natural gas from Russia.4 Other
European countries, such as Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic,
import between 65 to 97 percent of all natural gas from Gazprom, and other Russian gas
companies.5 Such lofty reliance upon Russia for natural gas severely restricts many

3

Robert Rapier, “World Sets Record For Fossil Fuel Consumption,” Forbes, June 8,
2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2016/06/08/world-sets-record-for-fossil-fuelconsumption/#d3db608365f7.
4
David Yanofsky, “The EU Countries That Depend the Most on Gazprom’s Russian
Gas,” Quartz, April 22, 2015, https://qz.com/388148/the-eu-countries-that-depend-themost-on-gazproms-russian-gas/.
5
Ibid.
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Central and Eastern European nations from a range of economic, foreign, and defense
policies vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. Thus, the impending global energy problem
will encompass nearly every aspect of policy to include economic, foreign and defense
considerations as well.
Confronting an energy dilemma is not a new problem for Europe. The continent
as a whole has been facing an energy crisis for decades. A combination of a reliance on
foreign imports, the decline in nuclear energy post-Fukushima, and the growing
discontent with carbon-based fuels and climate change has left the region grasping for
solutions. Beginning in 2010, the EU sought to transition into a new era of prosperity and
forward-thinking with a policy known as Europe 2020. Chief among the cited goals was a
sustainable shift away from hydrocarbons in light of climate change considerations. 6 The
Europe 2020 vision was predicated on the Union’s economic crisis in 2009. Although the
large aims of Europe 2020 were economically centered, the policy outlined a detailed
energy policy and target goals. The policy called for a 30 percent emissions reduction by
2020, as well as a shift away from carbon-based fuels to an increase in renewable energy
sources.7 Additionally, the Europe 2020 plan envisioned a modernization of
transportation sectors and increased energy efficiency across the Union.8 Thus, since
2010, EU nations individually, and the Union as a whole, has sought a new answer to its
energy crisis. However, as the EU sought to unveil a new era of economic and energy

6

European Commission, Europe 2020: A Strategy for Smart, Sustainable and Inclusive
Growth, (Brussels, 2010), 6, http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:2020:FIN:EN:PDF.
7
Ibid.
8
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policy, Germany unveiled its own energy policy designed to take the most dramatic steps
forward into the future.
In 2010, as the EU revealed the Europe 2020 policy, the German government
passed its own energy reform legislation. The policy was called “Energiewende,” and has
become the German answer to energy innovation, transition, and energy independence.
Energiewende, translated literally to “energy transition,” seeks to, foremost, make
Germany clean energy independent. Thus, Energiewende is Germany’s answer to three
separate issues: climate change, lack of sufficient diversification of energy sources, and
current reliance on foreign exporters for hydrocarbons including oil and natural gas.
Climate change and energy diversification, however, remain the primary stated
motivating concerns behind the policy. Germany’s Energiewende is part of the larger
European trend and concern with “decarbonization” of energy sources – moving away
from carbon-based, CO2 emitting sources such as oil, coal, and natural gas, and moving
to renewable energy sources – as presented in the Europe 2020 strategy. However,
whereas the EU envisioned a slower transition, Energiewende seeks to propel German
reliance on renewables by as much as 45 percent in 2020. Additionally, the policy calls
for a 40 percent cut in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, and an 85-90 percent cut by
2050.9 Even more ambitious is the policy’s target for energy saving. Energiewende
outlines a goal for primary energy consumption in Germany to fall 20 percent below the
country’s 2008 levels by 2020, and 50 percent below by 2050.10

9

By comparison, the EU-agreed goal was a 20% reduction by 2020. The member states
have not agreed on a later target for 2050.
10
David Buchan, “The Energiewende – Germany’s Gamble,” The Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, (June 2012): 7, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/SP-261.pdf.
4

In addition to a move away from fossil fuels, Energiewende also outlines the total
abandonment of nuclear energy in Germany by 2020. Although this decision fits
alongside the post-Fukushima, anti-nuclear sentiment following the 2011 disaster, this
additional goal only adds to the policy’s difficulties. Despite the phase out, nuclear power
still remains one of Germany’s key energy sources. In 2016, nuclear power accounted for
13 percent of the country’s total electricity generation.11 Further complicating the
policy’s target goals is Germany’s position as a major industrial economy. Many of
Germany’s energy intensive industries have expressed concern that the march towards
renewables and retreat from nuclear power will drive up energy costs. This increase in
cost, alongside the potential for increased instability in electricity supply, could weaken
their global competitiveness.12 Cost concerns of the increased reliance on renewable
energy and simultaneous retreat from nuclear power are not limited to industry. Since the
launch of Energiewende in 2010, the average household cost of electricity has risen
nearly 50 percent.13 In 2013, Der Spiegel reported that over 300,000 German households
a year see their power turned off due to unpaid energy bills.14 The term “energy poverty”
has since become a mainstream and widespread criticism of the effects Energiewende has
on the German population, as prices per kilowatt hour continue to rise.
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Jeffrey Ball, “Germany’s High Priced Energy Revolution,” Forbes, March 14, 2017,
http://fortune.com/2017/03/14/germany-renewable-clean-energy-solar/.
12
David Buchan, “The Energiewende – Germany’s Gamble,” The Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies, (June 2012): 7, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/wpcontent/uploads/2012/06/SP-261.pdf.
13
Jeffrey Ball, “Germany’s High Priced Energy Revolution,” Forbes, March 14, 2017,
http://fortune.com/2017/03/14/germany-renewable-clean-energy-solar/.
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“How Electricity Became a Luxury Good,” Der Spiegel, September 4, 2013,
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/high-costs-and-errors-of-german-transitionto-renewable-energy-a-920288.html.
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Germany also faces potential challenges due to the nature of the timeline of the
policy. Such a rapid energy transformation – if successful – could have immense first
mover advantages. Such advantages could make Germany the leading nation in
renewable technology and energy policy, holding a sizeable share of the global market.
However, Germany currently runs the risk of locking itself prematurely into renewable
energy sources before global oil and gas markets have sunk costs. Energiewende also
risks a marriage to renewables before research and development, as well as renewable
technology, has resolved numerous key challenges. Such challenges include electric grid
complications and the notorious problem of storage. Indeed, Germany is facing the
prospect of an overhaul to its current electric grid system, as well as drastic infrastructure
development, in order to make way for Energiewende and its target reliance on
renewables. When taken together, these factors must be examined for their vast potential
strategic implications for Germany.
Although climate change remains the stated primary reason behind Energiewende,
the policy will undoubtedly alter Germany’s foreign policy, as well as numerous
economic and geopolitical considerations. If the energy transformation is a success,
Germany will be less reliant on foreign exporters, most notably Russia. If the policy fails
to meet either its 2020, 2030, and 2050 targets, however, Germany will be more reliable
on foreign imports to meet its energy needs. A continued reliance on Russian oil and gas
in the wake of an Energiewende failure faces the possibility of further dividing the
European Union. Many Central and Eastern European member states have sought energy
source alternatives to oil and gas, such as nuclear and coal, in order to rely less upon
Moscow. Indeed, in a twist of irony, should the energy transformation fail, Germany will

6

also become more reliable on French and Czech nuclear power, without any domestic
nuclear energy capability of its own. Such increased reliance on its numerous European
neighbors is likely to considerably alter Germany’s position as a pillar of the EU, which
could, in turn, affect EU cohesion regarding energy policy going forward. Economic
considerations are also worth noting, as an Energiewende failure would be catastrophic
for the German economy, and its immense investments in renewable technology.
While much acclaim has been granted to Germany’s Energiewende policy and its
potential for success, little attention has been dedicated to the prospect of its failure. If it
is true that such a drastic policy as Energiewende will alter nearly every consideration of
the German government, as has been suggested by many German government officials,
the potential for its failure must be considered.15 Defining failure, in case of Germany’s
Energiewende, is simple: if the policy fails to meet its stated target goals in both the short
and long term, the potential for successfully altering climate change and rendering
Germany clean energy independent will remain illusory. The short-term, intermediate,
and long-term goals explicitly outlined in the Energiewende policy have been deemed the
necessary steps Germany must make in order to meet the overarching aim of the energy
transformation. If these goals are not met, the policy will have failed. This is not to
suggest that the policy cannot succeed in various unforeseen ways. However, if Germany
fails to meet the policy’s stated target goals, Energiewende can be deemed a policy
failure.

15

Melissa Eddy, “German Energy Official Sounds a Warning,” The New York Times,
January 21, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/22/business/energyenvironment/german-energy-official-sounds-a-warning.html.
7

Presently, current trend levels suggest that Germany will not meet two of its three
stated policy target goals for 2020. Current energy consumption levels, although reduced
overall, are not in step with the necessary decrease Energiewende stipulates by 2020.
Additionally, contrary to the policy’s central objective to become more reliant on
renewable energy sources such as wind and hydroelectric power, Germany’s coal
dependence has continued to hover around 40 percent of the country’s energy generation
since the unveiling of Energiewende in 2010.16 Such a large continued dependence on
coal will only add to the difficultly in meeting the emission reduction target goal by 2020.
Indeed, the desire to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and total energy consumption, in
order to positively impact the environment and issue of climate change, has been the one
of the central-most pillars and overarching goals of Energiewende. If Germany proves it
is unable to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption, it is unlikely
Energiewende can contribute positively to overall climate change.
By setting its sights on a rapid transformation of energy sourcing and
consumption, Germany is once more striving for innovative global leadership.
Energiewende seeks not only to propel Germany’s energy policy and security into the
future, but also strives to be a model worthy of emulation across the EU. As the EU’s
pioneering member state, Germany’s energy transition success or failure will likely be
seen as a microcosm of the issues its fellow member states will face in the future. As
such, the success or failure of Energiewende, and its ability to affordably and positively

16

Jack Loughran, “Germany’s Reliance on Coal Continues Despite Renewables Push,”
Engineering and Technology, April 10, 2017,
https://eandt.theiet.org/content/articles/2017/08/germany-s-reliance-on-coal-continuesdespite-huge-push-towards-renewable-energy/.
8

impact climate change, and become energy independent, is likely to have widespread
effects across the EU into the future.
Germany is not the first EU nation to confront energy security issues. European
Union member nations in both Western and Central Eastern Europe have sought
strategies in recent years to distance themselves from energy dependency on Moscow,
and what has been described as Russia’s “pipeline power.”17 The Russian Federation has
become notorious for utilizing its status as a dominant global energy exporter for
coercive geopolitical purposes.18 Apart from climate concerns, the fear of continued
Russian influence in Europe through the energy sector has led many EU nations to revise
their energy policies. These new energy policies include bypassing Russian oil and
natural gas, opting instead for renewed dependency on coal, nuclear power, or renewable
energy sources. Germany’s Energiewende, therefore is not the first energy policy to take
on climate and geopolitical concerns. Where Energiewende remains a pioneering policy,
however, is in its forward-thinking, radical approach. Accordingly, the success or failure
of Energiewende is likely to impact EU energy security and policy approaches in a
variety of ways.
First, if Energiewende fails to reach its target goals in conjunction with its
denuclearization policy, many EU member states on similar denuclearization paths may
reconsider such an approach. This, in an ironic turn, would make the EU member states
that previously vowed to halt all nuclear energy production more dependent upon

17

Edoardo Saravalle, “Russia’s Pipeline Power,” Politico, June 20, 2017,
https://www.politico.eu/article/opinion-russias-pipeline-power/.
18
For example, the cut-off of natural gas supplies to Ukraine during the winter months of
2008, as well as 2015.
9

neighboring member states with continued civil nuclear programs. Second, Germany’s
continued reliance upon coal, which is likely to prevent success in its emissions reduction
target goal, could signal trouble ahead for EU climate policy cohesion. Decarbonization
goals have remained a pillar of EU energy policy since the early 2000s. If Germany
proves it is unable to reach its emissions reduction target goals, in either the short-term or
long-term, some EU member states may become less enthusiastic about Europe’s
decarbonization project. Such a debate would undoubtedly lead to a contentious period
for the EU, risking Union cohesion surrounding energy policy. Lastly, Energiewende’s
success or failure in lessening Germany’s dependence on Moscow could be decisive for
the Union. If Energiewende does not enable Germany to become energy independent,
many EU nations that have sought policies to reduce Russian dependency will be left
with the challenge of either reevaluating such policies, or being left to fend for
themselves in a hegemonic energy market dominated by the Russian Federation, aided by
Germany. The ability of Germany’s Energiewende to reach its target goals, therefore,
will have vast consequences upon the EU and the Union’s attitude toward energy policy
as well as the future of energy security throughout Europe.
In addition to successfully reaching target goals, Germany must also demonstrate
the affordability of its energy transition, in order to compel its fellow EU member states
to follow its model, in order for the energy policy to be deemed a long-term success.
Thus far, much of the evidence suggests Germany has not proven its energy
transformation to be an affordable policy option. Accordingly, Energiewende is likely to
not only fail to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and energy consumption, but also fail to
provide an energy policy model for its fellow EU member states. Such a failure would

10

risk not only immense domestic consequences for Germany, but international ones as
well. This thesis, therefore, will argue the following:
1. As current data suggests, Germany will likely not meet its two of its three
stated target goals outlined in the Energiewende policy. These include the
20% reduction in energy consumption by 2020, as well as the ambition to
reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 40% by 2020.
2. Such short-term target goal failures, combined with the rising renewable
energy and subsidy costs, and necessary future infrastructure development, are
likely to lead to a loss of popular domestic support for the energy transition
policy going forward. This will make both the intermediate and long-term
goals of the policy increasingly difficult to meet.
3. Energiewende will therefore, in time, likely prove to be a policy failure, with
far-reaching, negative implications on Germany’s economy and electric grid
system, as well as EU geopolitical realities, energy security, and cohesion as a
whole.
In sum, if the current state of Germany’s energy transformation is any indication,
Energiewende will likely fail in its overall stated goals for the short-term, including the
2020 target goals. Such short-term target goal failures will increase the likelihood of
intermediate and long-term target goal failures as well. Additionally, short-term,
intermediate, and long-term target goal Energiewende failures are likely to affect EU
attitudes regarding energy policy, as its member states continue to face widespread and
unique challenges. This, in turn, could lead to increased challenges regarding EU
cohesion going forward, as well as EU policy and energy security. Thus, if the energy

11

transition policy fails, both Germany and the EU are likely to be impacted. Therefore,
while the EU looks to Germany to forge the path of clean energy independence, it may
instead witness a cautionary tale of placing policy initiatives before market realities, with
severe short and long-term implications for the Union’s energy security.19
This thesis will make use of several key terms and theories. Accordingly,
definitions of such terms are as follows:
Central Eastern Europe (CEE) refers to a group of countries comprised of
Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania,
Poland, Romania, and Slovakia.
Energiewende translated literally in English is “energy transition,” although the
term is widely used in English language publications without translation. Energiewende
refers to the German policy of energy transformation passed into legislation in December
2010. It is the current energy policy of the German government today, with target goals
set for 2020, 2022, 2025, 2030, and 2050. The overall aim of the policy seeks to
eliminate carbon-based fuels as well as nuclear energy over a relatively short time, in
favor of renewable energy sources. The policy stipulates three distinct ambitions: a
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, an increase in reliance on renewable energy
sources, and a decrease in energy consumption levels.
Energy security can be defined as the uninterrupted availability of energy sources
at an affordable price. However, energy security has many aspects including short-term

19

This thesis will look at long-term trends and data beginning in 1989 to the present day.
The year 1989 was chosen as a start date for long-term trends due to the fall of the Soviet
Union and the immense trends Europe underwent as a result. Accordingly, all energy data
pertaining to Europe, and particularly Central Eastern Europe, begins modernly in 1989.
12

and long-term security concerns. This thesis will discuss both short-term energy security
concerns, such as supply-demand balance and connectivity concerns, as well as long-term
energy security considerations including energy independence, and the connection
between energy security, defense, and foreign policy.
European Union, or EU is a political and economic union consisting of 28
countries: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark,
Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania,
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain,
Sweden, and the United Kingdom.20 While this thesis will discuss the different problems
facing Western and Central Eastern Europe, all broad and unspecified analysis of
“European” energy policy and security is confined to EU countries.
First mover theory postulates that a competitive advantage is gained by a business
that is able to be the first to bring a specific product or service to market. For the
purposes of this thesis, first mover advantages and disadvantages will be analyzed in
accordance with Germany being the first mover as a major industrialized nation to pursue
an energy policy based largely upon renewables.
Hydrocarbon fuels are fuels that contain only carbon and hydrogen, often
occurring in petroleum, natural gas, and coal. The European trend of “decarbonization”
refers to a shift away from dependence upon hydrocarbon fuels in favor of renewable
energy sources.

20

On May 29, 2019, the United Kingdom will officially leave the Union, following the
membership referendum that occurred in the UK on June 23, 2016.
13

Liquefied natural gas (LNG) refers to a primarily methane and ethane gas
obtained from underground and undersea in porous sedimentary rocks. The process of
liquefaction involves cooling the natural gas to a liquid state in order to ease
transportation and shipping over long distances whereby pipeline transportation is not
feasible. Natural gas transportation through pipelines has been of particular concern in
Europe in recent years, following the Russia-Ukraine and Russia-Belarus gas disputes.
Renewable energy sources (RES) refers to regenerative energy sources to include
biomass, hydropower, geothermal, wind, and solar energy. However, the vast percentage
of the renewable energy market today focuses largely on hydropower, wind, and solar
energy.
Shale gas refers to a natural gas extracted from shale rock using fracking, or
hydraulic fracturing of the rock. It is comprised primarily of methane. The European
Commission has estimated that nearly 16 trillion cubic meters of shale gas is theoretically
recoverable in the EU today.
Smart grid refers to a class of technology used to bring electricity delivery
systems into the 21st century, using computer-based remote control and automation. This
advanced technology includes advanced sensors that allow operators to assess grid
stability that give consumers better information and automatically report outages. In
addition, batteries are used to store excess energy and make it available later to the grid in
order to meet customer demand.21

21

U.S. Department of Energy Office of Electricity Delivery & Energy Reliability, Grid
Modernization and the Smart Grid, (Washington D.C. 2017),
https://energy.gov/oe/activities/technology-development/grid-modernization-and-smartgrid.
14

Transmission system operators (TSOs) are responsible for providing and
operating high voltage networks for long-distance transmission of electricity as well as
for supply of lower-level regional distribution systems. TSOs are natural monopolies.
This means that high infrastructure costs give the largest supplier in the industry, often
the premier supplier in the market, an immense advantage over potential competitors.22
Western Europe refers to a group of countries comprised of Belgium, France,
Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, Monaco, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, and the
United Kingdom. The author has adapted the CIA definition of Western Europe to
include Germany, based on both geographic and economic considerations, for the
purposes of this thesis.

22

Jeffrey M. Perloff, Microeconomics, (England: Pearson Education, 2012), 394.
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CHAPTER ONE
ENERGY IN EUROPE TODAY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW

Energy has undergone immense changes in the preceding three decades. In 1989,
energy infrastructures served one billion customers, fifty percent of oil supply was in the
hands of nation-states, and the Washington Consensus had just demonstrated the clear
winner in the world to be Western-style democracy. By contrast, 2018 has seen the
expansion of energy infrastructure to an additional three billion customers, ninety-seven
percent of the world’s oil reserves are owned by nation-states, and the Washington
Consensus has been replaced by the Moscow/Beijing Consensus, revealing the post-Cold
War revival of autocratic and communist states. The growth of coal has slowed, as the
world has witnessed the rise of liquefied natural gas (LNG), as well as the shale gas
boom. The 2011 Fukushima disaster has seen some countries move away from nuclear
energy, while others continue to embrace a domestic nuclear energy capability. Markets
are beginning to behold the highest price volatility of oil since the global financial
crisis.23 Clean energy and the rapid growth of renewable technology has come to the
forefront in response to climate change considerations.
Yet amid these transitions, problems such as energy dependence, and
diversification of sources abound. Countries continue to rely on unpredictable nationstate suppliers, and traditional, carbon-based sources. Now, more than ever, energy
security and policy is becoming a strategic consideration. Today, two regions in the
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world face long-term energy supply dependency via imports: Europe and Far East Asia.24
Although both regions face a daunting task regarding energy policy and foreign
dependency, the problems facing Europe, and particularly the EU, have become of
particular importance.

The Evolution of EU Energy Policy
Beginning in the late 1990s, energy policy in the European Union became largely
centralized in and guided by the European Commission. The Commission has historically
revolved energy policy around two key pillars: liberalization of European gas and
electricity markets, and climate change and environmental-related issues. Taken together,
these two pillars constitute the state of EU energy policy today. Accordingly, the
Commission has introduced key legislative packages and mandates regarding these two
pillars. Legislation regarding the liberalization of markets was introduced in the form of
three legislative packages. The most recent of these, known as the Third Energy Package,
entered into force in 2009.
The Energy Third Package outlined five main goals in accordance with the
internal energy market and associated structural problems such as grid and pipeline
connectivity. Chief among the Package’s goals was the “unbundling”25 of energy supply
from the operation of transmission networks, as well as increased transparency in retail
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markets for the benefit of its customers.26 Other aims of the Third Energy Package
included strengthening the independence of regulators, cross-border cooperation between
transmission system operators, and the creation of the Agency for the Cooperation of
Energy Regulators (ACER).27 The Third Package in particular was a response by the
Commission to the continued market concentration across the EU, whereby a small
number of corporations control vast amounts of the market. This has severely limited
cross border trade in Europe, thereby limiting diversification of energy sources and
suppliers.
Altogether, all three legislative packages aimed to unbundle the European energy
market in order to foster competition, while seeking to insure increased price
transparency. Furthermore, by fostering cross border cooperation between EU member
states, the Commission sought to bring together what had become “a patchwork of
nationally developed electricity and gas markets.”28 The legislative packages introduced
to liberalize energy markets across the EU have not yet proven successful across the
entirety of the Union. Significant strides have been made across Western Europe since
the unveiling of the Third Energy Package, although Central and Eastern Europe continue
to face problems with infrastructure connectivity and market diversification.
The second pillar of EU energy policy has centered on environmental and
climate-related concerns. The Commission has launched a multitude of climate centered
energy policies and initiatives. Following the Kyoto Protocol initially signed into force in
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1997, the EU sought to develop and adopt more comprehensive measures in the so-called
“fight against climate change.”29 Beginning in 2007, the Commission proposed new
target goals for 2020, 2030, and 2050. The targets for 2020 became known as the “20-2020 Directive” and outlined three key aims: 20% cut in greenhouse gas emissions, 20% of
EU energy from renewables, and 20% improvement in energy efficiency.30 The Directive
was enacted in 2009, in accordance with the Europe 2020 strategy, which sought to
expand economic growth in the EU, in part by emphasizing sustainable energy alongside
increased research and development.31
In 2014, the Commission adopted a 2030 climate and energy framework that built
upon the 2020 targets and policy. The new key targets for 2030 included: at least 40%
cuts in greenhouse gas emissions, at least 27% share for renewable energy, and at least
27% improvement in energy efficiency.32 Although the EU as a whole has not yet
adopted an agreed-upon energy directive or policy for its 2050 goals, the Commission
released a study in 2011 called the Energy Roadmap 2050. The study outlined various
milestones that would seek to make the EU a low-carbon economy by 2050. The
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roadmap suggested that by 2050, the EU needs to have cut its greenhouse gas emissions
by 80%, alongside strong investments in smart grids.33
In addition to outlining the necessary progressive emissions reduction and
investment commitments, the 2050 Roadmap also analyzed “decarbonization scenarios”
if the 2050 aims were met. These scenarios included high energy efficiency with political
commitments to large energy savings, a diversified supply of technologies whereby no
one technology is preferred, and strong support for RES, and low nuclear reliance to
include no new nuclear plants.34 Absent from the Roadmap was analysis of international
concerns or considerations regarding Europe’s current key suppliers, most notably
Russia. Although the study did assert that the 2050 aims would leave the EU fully
diversified, absent biomass. When analyzing potential biomass exporters in the long-term
future, the roadmap labeled the Russian Federation as the foremost potential supplier.35
Thus, even as the EU seeks to outline a future of energy independence, the Russian
Federation still occupies a supplier role in the proposed Roadmap.

Energy Policy and Security Problems in the EU
One of the key problems facing Europe today is the so far incomplete integration
of all EU member states. Since the turn of the millennium, the EU has expanded its
membership in three separate rounds of enlargement to include Central and Eastern
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European states.36 This incomplete integration of CEE nation-states involves a variety of
sectors, including telecommunication, transportation, and energy.37 Currently, many
Central and Eastern European states are burdened with insufficient infrastructure to
accommodate integration with the rest of Western Europe. This was an intentional policy
of Moscow to keep former bloc states highly dependent upon the Soviet Union.38 The
detrimental consequences of insufficient intraregional infrastructure today are most
apparent in the energy sector. Furthermore, countries outside of the EU – such as
Moldova and Ukraine – are particularly at risk from an increasingly regionally-aggressive
Russia. Such risk is a consequence of both insufficient infrastructural connectivity to the
rest of Europe, and current dependency upon Moscow for oil and natural gas.39
Europe’s energy problem is also a strategic problem. Diversification of sources,
what many of the Commission policies sought to address, has severely limited the ability
of many EU states to decrease reliance on foreign imports. In Europe today, the Russian
Federation continues to dominate regional oil and gas imports. Before the legislative
efforts were undertaken to liberalize EU gas and electricity markets, most EU member
states had only one utility company controlling the supply network and either producing
or importing gas on the basis of “an exclusive supply contract.”40 Russia’s gas giant,
Gazprom, dominated supply to the CEE region, ensuring a monopoly through supply
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contracts with individual nations. In effect, Russia was able to enjoy ensured demand
with no market competition, while rendering former bloc states once more entirely
dependent upon Moscow for their gas supplies. To illustrate the regional monopoly
Gazprom has thus far enjoyed throughout Europe, the 140 billion cubic meters of gas
Gazprom exports to Europe accounts for only one-third of its total production, but twothirds of its revenue.41 In 2006, the Swedish Defense Research Agency conducted a study
which revealed that between 1991 and 2004, there had been over 40 “politically
motivated energy cut-offs across the former Warsaw Pact and Baltic States.”42 The vast
majority of such cut-offs had been of gas supplies.
Today, the energy security environment remains largely unchanged for most
Central and Eastern European states. Although the Commission’s unbundling legislation
has proven to be a success for many Western European states, the CEE region is still
largely dependent upon Russia and Gazprom for its supply of gas without the benefit of
liberalized regional markets. The CEE region’s last defense mechanism to bulwark
against Gazprom’s regional monopoly was the role of transit countries from the gas
flowing from Russia to Western Europe, most notably Germany. However, the
completion of the Nord Stream pipeline and plans for Nord Stream 2 substantially
thwarted such a defense, as both lines circumvent the entire CEE region. Some CEE
countries, such as Poland, have been able to safeguard against Russian energy control, by
utilizing coal rather than gas to meet the nation’s energy needs.43 However, the growing
decarbonization trend across Europe has rejected coal and favored gas as a relatively
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CO2-light option. In turn, the decarbonization trend gripping Western Europe has proven
particularly difficult for CEE regions to comply with environmental energy policies,
while simultaneously seeking to decrease dependency on Russia gas.

The “Big Green Bang” and Energy Diversification in Europe
In many respects, the recent push for more energy has been eclipsed by a newer
demand for clean energy. Colloquially, this has come to be known as the “Big Green
Bang.” Currently, Western European states are far better positioned to reject carbonbased fuels than their CEE neighbors. This is due to both the widespread policy success
of liberalizing predominately Western European energy markets, and a decreased reliance
on Russian gas that has thus far been unobtainable to CEE states. However,
decarbonization trends are evident throughout the EU, and have been seen as the
foremost means to diversify energy sources and suppliers. The European turn to
renewable energy sources (RES) began largely in 2009, as the EU first outlined target
objectives for 2020, including a 20% dependency on renewable energy by 2020. Before
the EU commitment to investing in RES technology and research and development,
however, it was not at all clear that renewables would win the day in Europe.
Once the impending energy crisis was understood, the EU was forced to consider
a variety of possibilities for change. Such possibilities included a decrease in energy
consumption, developing robust partnerships with a variety of suppliers, diversification
of sources and supply routes, and the replacement of old fuels with new sources.
Although numerous EU energy policies have stipulated a decrease in carbon-emitting
source consumption, cutting energy consumption altogether has not been popular across
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the continent. Indeed, many scholars today assert that the notable decrease in energy
consumption in Germany has been done out of necessity, due to the increasing cost of
energy within the country.44 Although Western Europe has been somewhat successful in
developing partnerships with a variety of energy suppliers, Central and Eastern European
nations still remain predominately dependent on Russia. Therefore, the greatest EU
success thus far has been the replacement of old fuel sources with new, technologically
advanced sources. Such sources have included renewables, natural gas, and nuclear
energy.
The diversification of energy sources has been a dominating trend in Europe for
the past fifteen years. Both Western and CEE states across the continent have striven to
diversify energy portfolios to include a variety of source dependencies, even when energy
suppliers remain unchanged.45 Renewable energy has allowed for new, innovative
sources to win the day in Europe’s quest for a solution, but has thus far been a luxury for
the wealthiest of EU countries.46 The shale gas boom offered some hope to countries in
the CEE region, as the potential for disruption and competition could have led to an
opening in European gas markets, threatening Russia’s position as holding the regional
monopoly. However, these hopes were diminished some, as countries across Europe
began to protest the practices associated with shale gas, most notably hydraulic fracking.
Since the shale gas boom, and following some European hopes that the resource would
soon flood EU markets as a viable alternative to conventional gas, countries across the
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EU began banning its exploration and extraction. Two EU countries in particular have
seen a dramatic public outcry, denouncing the practices: France and Bulgaria.47 The
practice has since been banned in Germany, Scotland, and Denmark as well.48 Although
shale gas remains a viable alternative in the United Kingdom and Poland, both of which
maintain ongoing programs of exploratory drillings and testing.49
Similar to fracking and the shale gas boom, nuclear energy has undergone
immense changes in recent years across the EU. Following the Fukushima disaster in
2011, several countries across Europe elected to eliminate nuclear power plants, and turn
away from nuclear energy. The trend became known as the “nuclear phase out” or
“denuclearization,” and has taken hold in numerous EU countries including Belgium,
Germany, Italy, Spain, and Switzerland.50 Yet many Central and Eastern European
nations still look to nuclear energy as a significant source for domestic electricity.
Nations including the Czech Republic, Hungary, Lithuania, Slovakia, and Poland,
continue to depend upon nuclear energy as a low-carbon, domestic capability for
electricity generation.51 Indeed, nuclear energy has provided numerous CEE states the
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necessary supply to lessen dependency on Russia. Furthermore, several Western
European states have thus far been immune from the nuclear phase out trend. Countries
such as France, Europe’s most enthusiastic nuclear state, and the UK are continuing
nuclear operation, while maintaining plans to build more plants in the future.52 Although
the post-Fukushima trend away from nuclear energy has eclipsed key EU states, the death
of nuclear energy in Europe has not yet come.53 Its future, however, remains uncertain.
Carbon-based fuels continue to remain dominant across the whole of Europe, and
are still a facet of the global energy market. Countries from Germany to Poland to
Bulgaria continue to rely on domestic coal production to account for large percentages of
total generated electricity.54 Thus, despite the “Big Green Bang” and domestic energy
policies outlining a more heightened reliance on RES, carbon-based fuels continue to
thrive across the continent. In 2015, nearly one-half of all electricity generated across the
EU came from carbon-based fuels.55 Coal production and export from EU nations is in
decline, and has continued a downward trend since 1997. However, Germany currently
relies on coal for 40% of its total electricity, while 45% of all electricity generation in
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Bulgaria comes from coal.56 Similarly, Poland relies on coal for 48% of its electricity
production.57 Indeed, contrary to the decarbonization trend across Europe, Poland has
extended its long-term goals to include a 60% reliance on coal for all domestic energy
production by 2030.58

EU Energy Markets Today
Altogether, Europe has an energy problem. Nearly every state across the
continent, both EU member and non-member states have begun to make major
adjustments to energy policies in order to address what appears to be an imminent threat.
However, the threat each country is facing is not one in the same. Western European
nations have begun to address climate-related threats, as some look to low-carbon sources
such as nuclear energy, while others turn to renewables for a solution. Additionally, many
Western European nations are reaping the benefits of EU liberalization energy policies,
as energy imports have begun to reflect fair market prices.59 Central and Eastern
European states face a different threat. The CEE region is currently gripped with
dependence on the Russian Federation. Such reliance has proven to be politically and
economically dangerous in recent years. Therefore, the threat many CEE nations are
facing cannot be answered by emissions reductions and increased RES reliance alone.
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Instead, Central and Eastern Europe states are beginning to seek a diverse supply of
energy sources. These sources often include carbon-based fuels, such as coal and oil, as
well as new suppliers such as the U.S.
To view the energy market and security environment in Europe today as unified
would be a grave mistake. Different regions across Europe face diverse problems, with
far different solutions. In light of the success of energy market liberalization in Western
Europe, the decarbonization trend is far more advanced, with countries pledging reduced
emissions and increased RES dependency in the very near term. However, many
countries in Western Europe are finding the divorce from carbon-based fuels more
difficult than was previously thought. Germany is the premier example of such a
contradiction, as its Energiewende policy stipulates a 40-45% RES reliance, alongside a
40% emissions reduction by 2020. However, a vast amount of Germany’s current
electricity production relies upon coal, particularly in the wake of the Merkel
government’s 2011 decision to phase out all nuclear power plants from the country.
Germany, in a sense, has become a microcosm of the problems facing Western Europe:
liberalized energy markets, eclipsed by the decarbonization trend, yet largely unable to
diversify energy sources away from all carbon-based fuels.
Central and Eastern Europe, conversely, face a daunting problem in regards to
current reliance on Russia for oil and gas. Thus far, the CEE region has been unable to
liberalize energy markets as successfully as their neighbors to the West, revealing a
continuing power imbalance with Moscow vis-à-vis natural gas contracts. This has
caused many CEE nations to cling to domestic energy production as a bulwark against
increased dependency for foreign imports. Such domestic production in the CEE region
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comes largely from either coal or nuclear energy. Thus, the decarbonization trend has not
flourished in Central and Eastern Europe for two reasons. First, the rising cost of RES
technology, research, and development is a luxury unavailable to many CEE states.60
Second, domestic energy production in the CEE region, cultivated largely as a defense
against dependency on Russia gas, principally relies on carbon-based fuels, or nuclear
energy. Thus, the problems facing Europe today are both complex, and region-dependent.
The solutions available to different European states vary. Therefore, energy policy, and
ultimately energy security, in Europe going forward will depend upon a variety of factors
and considerations, not all of which will bring cohesive solutions.
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CHAPTER TWO
THE EVOLUTION OF GERMAN ENERGY POLICY

The story of Germany’s energy policy over the years is a story of progression. At
times throughout its history, the German government has been enthusiastic and expectant
about the future of energy. This has happened twice in modern history: Germany’s first
approach to nuclear energy in the 1960s, and its approach to renewable energy today.
Germany has long been home to the forefront of technology, innovation, and science.
This strong penchant for improvement and modernism has enabled Germany to be on the
cusp of all that science and technology has to offer. Its approach to energy and energy
policy has been no different. Germany has also dedicated significant resources to
research. In 2010, the German government extended a 2.4 billion euro funding project
over five years to fund university level research and development endeavors.61 Even after
the funding project ended in 2015, Germany today still maintains Europe’s largest
national budget for research and development.62 Put simply, the national fabric of
Germany has long included technological prowess and research-driven innovation.
Accordingly, following the end of World War II, German energy policy has followed this
model to include forward-thinking and scientific modernization as a key concept in every
post-war energy policy.
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German Strategic Culture and Energy Policy
Germany has risen to become the de facto leader in Europe in recent years.
Despite the seat of EU leadership residing in Brussels, Germany has led the way forward
in many key European issues from Greek bailouts, to the Ukrainian crisis, to current
migration quotas. Although German strategic culture outlines hesitancy and restraint in
military and defense postures, Germany has risen to the top of European economic
matters. Indeed, the German penchant to lead in innovation has been at the forefront of
German energy policy for over a decade. Germany also tends to think long-term. Indeed,
long-term orientation continues to be a distinct facet of Germany’s culture profile.63
Also, distinct within Germany’s culture profile is the general disdain for
uncertainty. Along with long-term orientation, Germans tend to dislike the unknown, and
supplement uncertainty by relying strongly on expertise.64 This tendency also explains
Germany’s dedication to science, technology, research, and development. In accordance
with a high uncertainty avoidance, Germany prides deductive rather than inductive
reasoning.65 Furthermore, Germans are highly pragmatic, and given to meeting goals and
requirements. All of these factors have been of significant importance in Germany’s
energy policy evolution since the end of World War II. Therefore, the necessary context
to understanding Germany’s current push for increased reliance on RES, as outlined in
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the Energiewende policy, can be found in previous decades of German energy policy
which reveal a repeated call for innovation and technical prowess.

Hydrocarbons in German Energy Policy
Carbon-based fuels were the first major German energy source dating back to the
18th century, and are still a facet of German electricity production today. Although
Germany has been a champion of the Western European decarbonization trend, a large
percentage of its total generated electricity production depends upon coal. Both coal and
oil dominated German energy markets largely until 1966 when nuclear power began to
emerge as a competitor. Nuclear energy was, at one time, preferable, as it was seen as a
low-carbon source compared to coal and oil. However, following the reunification of
Germany in 1989, both coal and oil markets once more intensified throughout the
country. At the same time coal and oil markets reignited across Germany following
reunification, a new energy source began a steady growth: Russian natural gas.
The growth of German reliance on Russian gas since the end of the Cold War has
continued to mature. Between 2000-2012, Russian gas made up 21% of Germany’s
energy supply. Furthermore, Russian gas comprises over 40% of Germany’s total foreign
gas import today.66 Further exemplifying the German dependence upon Russian gas are
two pipeline projects connecting Russian gas to Germany: Nord Stream and Nord Stream
2. The first pipeline project, Nord Stream, was commissioned in 2011, and runs for 1,224
kilometers. Running under the Baltic Sea, the pipeline connects Vybord, Russia to
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Lubmin, Germany in the Eastern part of the country. 67 The pipeline maintains the
capacity to deliver 55 billion cubic meters of gas annually.68 Moreover, the Nord Stream
2 pipeline, which first began in April 2012, was intended to increase connectivity
between Russia, Germany, and several key European states including Norway and the
UK. Construction on Nord Stream 2 has not yet been completed, following EU sanctions
on Gazprom in 2012, one of the project’s key leaders.69
The key pipeline projects connecting Russian gas from Siberia to Germany was
intended to be an offset strategy as Germany continues to transition away from carbonbases fuels and nuclear energy. Following the 2010 Energiewende policy, some began
expressing doubt regarding the future target goals of Germany’s intended emissions
reduction if the country continues to rely upon coal. Currently, Germany relies upon
lignite, or soft brown coal, for 25% of its electricity. 70 Additionally, Germany also relies
upon hard coal for nearly 18% of its annual electricity.71 Such substantial continued
reliance upon lignite and hard coal combined runs contrary to the decarbonization trend
that Germany has spearheaded since 2000. Russian natural gas, therefore, has the benefit
of being both relatively low-carbon and, following Nord Stream, easily accessible. Thus,
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current German reliance upon Russian gas is largely seen as a protection against wind
and solar technologies that may not be able to provide sufficient electricity in accordance
with both 2020 and 2050 target goals.
The state of both coal and gas dependency in Germany today is paradoxical. Since
2000, the German government has made clear its resolve to lessen dependency upon
carbon-based fuels, particularly coal and oil. Instead, the country advocated an increased
reliance upon renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar power. In 2010, the
German government reaffirmed its RES support by passing the Energiewende policy.
Since its launch, however, Germany continues to rely upon coal for 40% of its electricity
production annually. Further problematic is the country’s dependence upon lignite.
Although lignite is the most abundant form of coal found in Germany, as well as the
cheapest to burn, it is also the dirtiest form of coal, resulting in higher emissions than
hard coal or natural gas. Thus, the continued use of lignite, as well as hard coal, in
Germany has made its emissions reduction target goal increasingly difficult to reach. In
order for Germany to reach its 40% emissions reduction goal by 2020, carbon-rich
sources, such as lignite and hard coal, must be greatly reduced or eliminated altogether.
Thus, the current paradox Germany is experiencing has led many scholars to describe the
current situation as a German “coal conundrum.”72 Also problematic is Germany’s
continued reliance upon Russian natural gas. Although Germany’s gas market is often
seen as a security strategy against the potential failure of its future RES dependency
goals, its place in Germany’s energy sector will continue to complicate emissions

72

Arne Jungjohann and Craig Morris, “The German Coal Conundrum,” Heinrich Boll
Foundation, (Washington, D.C. 2014), 4,
http://www.indiaenvironmentportal.org.in/files/file/German_Coal_Conundrum.pdf.
34

reduction goals long-term, despite its relatively low carbon footprint.73 However, many
scholars agree that no one decision has so uniquely created the current “coal conundrum”
and subsequent shift to Russian gas as the German decision to phase out all domestic
nuclear energy.74

Nuclear Energy in Germany
The history of nuclear energy in Germany is fraught with disagreements. Nuclear
energy first emerged in Germany in 1961 with the first commission of an experimental
nuclear power plant.75 By 1966, Germany had produced its first megawatt of nuclear
energy.76 The support, however, did not last long. In response to the oil embargo in 1973,
West Germany made plans to extend its nuclear energy capability with a campaign to
build a dozen new power plants, under then Chancellor Helmut Schmidt.77 Soon after this
decision, West Germans began an anti-nuclear campaign, signaling a feeling of distrust
regarding nuclear energy and capability. This sentiment was exacerbated by the condition
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of Germany at the time, split between East and West, both armed with an immense
number of nuclear weapons provided by the USSR and US, respectively.78
In 1986, following the Chernobyl accident, German fears regarding nuclear
energy deepened. This fostered a deeper antinuclear sentiment in the country, that would
continue to worsen over the years. Three years prior to the accident, the newly
established Green Party in Germany had won a total of twenty-eight seats in Parliament.79
The Chernobyl accident in nearby Ukraine three years later added further support to the
antinuclear campaign fostered by the Green Party. By 1998, after fifteen years in
Parliament, the Green Party and the Social Democrats formed a coalition that led to the
2000 decision to phase out all nuclear energy in Germany by 2021.80 The 2000 decision
also marked the turning point to renewables in Germany, as the coalition government
sought to ensure that the gap left by nuclear energy would be filled by RES through a
“feed-in tariff.”81 Thus, by 2000, the Big Green Bang had already begun to emerge in
Germany.
The most recent flashpoint in German antinuclear sentiment followed the March
2011 Fukushima disaster.82 This time, however, Germany was not alone. Following the
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incident, the German government announced its decision to shut down eight of its nuclear
power plants in May 2011. This was a reversal of the Merkel governments 2010 decision
to reverse the original nuclear phase out law.83 The 2010 reversal of the nuclear phase out
was led by coalition government comprised of the Christian Democratic Union and the
pro-business Free Democratic Party, and called for an average twelve-year extension to
German nuclear reactors.84 The decision was immediately scrutinized by German
opposition parties and neighboring EU states as a “black day for energy policy.”85
However, the 2011 Fukushima disaster marked once more a turning point for the Merkel
government, as antinuclear sentiment soon swept over Europe.86 On June 30, 2011, the
German government announced its decision to retire 47% of the country’s nuclear
reactors.87 In addition, the policy outlined a complete nuclear phase by 2022, echoing the
original 2000 decision. The decision was passed with over 80% support in the German
Parliament.88 Today, the German government remains committed to its nuclear phase out
plan, as the policy has further been enshrined in the most recent energy policy –
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Energiewende. The gap left by nuclear energy, which continues to supply Germany with
13% electricity in 2016, is planned to be filled by renewable energy as soon as 2025.89

Renewable Energy Sources in German Energy Policy
Germany’s shift to renewable energy dates back to the 1980s. The original
German push for an increased reliance on RES began as a backlash to the decision to
increase Germany nuclear power plants in 1973. As Chancellor Helmut Schmidt sought
an alternative to Germany’s OPEC oil dependency, domestic nuclear energy once more
appeared on the rise. The initial push for domestic RES dependence, therefore, was
reactionary to long-held antinuclear sentiments in Germany. However, the widespread
support and growth for renewables did not occur until the Social Democrats and Green
Party coalition government beginning in 1998. With the law declaring the phase out of all
German nuclear reactors by 2021, enacted in 2000, the German turn to RES was all but
solidified. This was due, in large part, to the so-called “feed-in tariff” system entered into
law in 2000.
The feed-in tariff sought to promote the production of renewable energy sources
and technology, while encouraging business investments, and overall market production
of RES. This was done by introducing a variety of measures including: priority grid
access to RES, and fixed prices for energy producers for every kilowatt hour produced
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from an RES for a fixed period. 90 The tariff has been amended four times since 2000, in
order to revise the law in accordance with current RES practices.91 Even as the Merkel
government overturned the nuclear phase out law in 2010, increased RES investment and
infrastructure development had already taken hold throughout the country. Following the
2011 decision to once more continue the previously planned phase out nuclear energy,
this time by 2022, renewables once more began a steady growth throughout Germany that
continues today. In 2000, German electricity production from RES was 6.2%. In 2017,
this figure had risen to 30.4%.92
Although Germany’s clean energy transformation was formally enacted into law
in 2010, the push for renewables in the country began roughly a decade earlier. Key
legislation adopted first in 2000, including both the nuclear phase out and feed-in tariff,
set the path that the Merkel government would continue down in the form of
Energiewende. Thus, the current RES movement is not a new trend in Germany. Rather,
Energiewende should be seen as the evolution and lofty progression of the German push
for clean energy that began a decade prior. However, there remain facets of the
Energiewende policy that set it apart from other historical German RES initiatives.
Energiewende outlines a prompt timeline for Germany to be 80% RES dependent by
2050. Even the short-term goals of the policy stipulate a 40-45% RES dependency by
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2025. Thus, while previous clean energy legislation in Germany sought a gradual
transition to renewable energy, Energiewende seeks to propel Germany forward in rapid
fashion.
In many ways, the history of German energy policy has been preparing for the
eventual, complete reliance upon renewable energy sources. Germans have expressed a
dislike and distrust of nuclear energy since the Cold War, with two policy phase outs of
all German nuclear reactors. Furthermore, Germany has been among the most vocal
Western European and EU member states advocating decarbonization. While German
reliance upon carbon-based fuels such as coal, and foreign imports such as Russian gas
continue to abound, the German government remains adamant that such reliance is
doomed to a phase out. In short, Germany has set the stage for the world to witness a true
clean energy transformation. The question remains, however, if Energiewende will be an
attainable policy for Germany. The answer, in turn, is likely to reveal to the rest of
Europe whether or not overall RES dependency, and an industrial low-carbon economy,
is attainable or doomed to failure. The next chapter will detail an extensive case study
analysis of the Energiewende, and particularly the stated short-term policy goals, as well
as the reasons behind their impending failure.
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CHAPTER THREE
ENERGIEWENDE: A CASE STUDY

The German energy transition policy, known as Energiewende, has set out to
revolutionize renewable energy for Europe. The policy itself is characteristically German
in nature, seeking to propel the country into the future nearly twice as fast as any other
European state. It reflects a strong economy and environmental modernization that the
EU has come to expect from Germany, while exhibiting the German mentality of
morality, and its synergistic relationship with policy.93 For this reason, Germany’s energy
policy, specifically the Energiewende, has been chosen as a case study to analyze the
energy security environment in Europe, as well as the policy implications of European
energy trends such as energy source diversification and decarbonization. In addition to
maintaining the role as the de-facto leader of the European Union, Germany has sought to
outpace all other European energy policies and initiatives. The energy transition, in turn,
has come to exemplify a European attempt at policy trend-setting. Additionally, Germany
has the unique advantage of a sizeable national science and technology focus, the fourth
largest economy in the world, and comparatively stable relations with the Russian
Federation, particularly as it relates to energy. For this reason, the German Energiewende
serves as a premier example of the energy security environment in Europe.
Energiewende was unveiled in 2010, and outlines a daring approach and
ambitious shift to renewable energy, without the aid of nuclear energy. The German
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target goal for emissions reduction by 2020 doubles that of the EU-wide emissions
reduction policy by the same time. Furthermore, Germany intends to be between 40-45%
dependent upon renewable energy sources by 2025, and 80% by 2050. At its most daring,
Energiewende calls for a drastic reduction in energy consumption, outlining a 20% fall
from 2008 levels by 2020, and a 50% fall by 2050.94
In addition to environmental concerns, Energiewende seeks to become the global
standard for energy transition. The policy strives not only to succeed by meeting its target
goals, but also success through imitation. Indeed, the Energiewende policy is meant to
signal to other Western and Central Eastern European states that an energy revolution is
possible. Accordingly, all EU eyes have fixed upon the German energy experiment as it
seeks to prove, foremost, that the transition to near total renewable energy dependency
can be attained. Even more daunting, Germany intends to prove that such a
transformation is affordable, and can be done without the aid of nuclear energy.

Energiewende Target Goals and Objectives
Germany has set high standards for itself and its energy policy. The energy
transition policy is comprised of various ambitions with targets as far reaching as 2050.
At the heart of Energiewende lie four central objectives: “to combat climate change,
avoid nuclear risks, improve energy security, and guarantee competitiveness and
growth.”95 Accordingly, the key aims of Energiewende are concentrated on CO2
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emission and energy consumption reductions, nuclear energy elimination, and an
increased share of renewable sources in German domestic power consumption.96 The
Federal Ministry of Education and Research describes the overall aim of the
Energiewende policy to be the realization of “a stable supply of energy which is
economically viable and environmentally friendly.”97 Accordingly, the national energy
goals outlined in the Energiewende policy can be categorized by three separate targets:
1. A 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020, and between 80-95% by
2050.98
2. A 20% reduction in energy consumption by 2020, and 50% by 2050.99
3. A total of 35% gross electricity consumption to come from renewable sources by
2020, and 80% by 2050.100
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In addition to these three goals, Germany also intends to phase out the last of its
nuclear reactors by 2022. The nuclear phase out policy was passed into legislation in
Germany in 2011, following the Fukushima accident.101 The decision to pursue a
renewables transformation without the aid of nuclear energy substantially increases the
difficulty of meeting policy goals. In 2010, a year before the nuclear phase out was
announced, Germany generated nearly 20% of its electricity production from nuclear
energy.102 Not only did nuclear energy provide a significant portion of German electricity
generation, it did so with no greenhouse gas emissions. Indeed, before the announced
phase out, nuclear power remained Germany’s foremost low-carbon energy source.103
Thus, the nuclear phase out policy adds an additional constraint to obtaining an energy
transformation and low-carbon electricity as outlined in Energiewende.
In place of traditional, carbon-based sources, the energy transformation seeks to
place renewable energy sources at the forefront of German electricity production. In
particular, both wind and solar energy are seen as the backbone of the Energiewende
policy.104 This is no small task. The capital of Berlin lies at roughly the same latitude as
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Calgary.105 Germany as a whole, meanwhile, gets on average as much sunlight per year
as Seattle, Washington.106 One German CEO, Jurgen Grossman, described the German
solar power endeavor as making “as much sense as growing pineapples in Alaska.”107
Yet, Energiewende outlines a substantial dependency upon, and expansion of, solar
power. Wind also holds a key place in the policy. By 2050, wind is slated to hold key
importance in German electricity production. Energiewende calls for “a massive
expansion of onshore and offshore wind power capacity.”108 The need to massively
expand wind power – particularly offshore wind power – remains one of the most
expensive components of Energiewende. At the launch of the policy, it was estimated
that an additional 75 billion euros would need to be invested in the expansion offshore
wind farming.109 This would need to be done in order to boost wind power capability to
produce 25 GW by 2030.110
Furthermore, renewables such as offshore wind farms, increase the need for an
expansion of Germany’s grid system. Due to an increase reliance upon renewables,
policymakers assessed that an “overlay grid” would need to be placed upon Germany’s
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existing electricity grid system.111 This would need to be done in order to ensure the
transport of electricity over great distances with minimal losses. Although electricity
generation is historically done near the centers of consumption, future reliance on RES,
such as offshore wind, will require the development of a new grid system in addition to a
new method of electricity generation. The grid expansion and upgrade must also be done
in order for Germany to continue to play a key role in Europe as an energy supplier.112
Therefore, alongside large-scale investments in RES, Energiewende also entails
considerable modernization of Germany’s current grid infrastructure to make way for the
future integration of renewables into the electricity market. Energiewende, consequently,
demands that Germany harness both nature and its electricity grid system in ways never
before seen. Furthermore, the policy has the added burden of doing so in an economically
beneficial way.

Cost Analysis of Energiewende
In addition to being one of the most innovative energy policies in Europe,
Energiewende is also estimated to be the most expensive. The total cost of implementing
Energiewende by 2025 in the electricity sector alone was estimated to be 520 billion
euros.113 A 2017 study revealed the estimated costs of Energiewende by 2030 to be
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between 600-700 billion euros.114 This figure does not include costs associated with what
will become necessary transformations of the heating and transportation sectors.115
Before the launch of Energiewende, it was clear that subsidies would be required to
overcome the “innate cost and convenience advantage of hydrocarbons,” which have
traditionally not been penalized for the carbon they emit.116 The Germany government
acknowledged this in June 2011, by stating that “the expansion of renewable energy must
be cost-efficient to guarantee affordable electricity prices [because] what is a niche
market must become a volume market.”117 The cost of transforming the niche RES
market into a volume market in Germany has been done to great success with the feed-in
tariff. In 2000, Germany adopted a rigid tariff system through the Renewable Energy
Sources Act.118 The Act introduced fixed feed-in tariffs for each kind of renewable
energy, generally guaranteed for 20 years, and set to decrease over time as the renewable
operators become more experienced in the technology.119
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Renewable Energy Sources Act
The goal of the Renewable Energy Sources Act was to generate enough
investments in RES technology to afford Germany an enormous increase in the share of
renewables in the country’s total electricity consumption. The policy ensures renewable
energy operators receive priority grid access, as well as a fixed price for every kilowatt
hour of energy produced from an RES.120 Furthermore, this fixed price is set for a fixed
period, generally 20 years.121 The fixed price is high enough to ensure a return on
investment for the operator. The extra cost, in turn, is paid for by all energy consumers
through a surcharge on electricity bills.122 Thus far, the policy has been credited with an
ensured RES investment security, which has allowed for the rapid expansion of RES
share in electricity consumption. The total generation of electricity from RES in Germany
in 2000 was 6.2%. This figure had more than tripled by 2012, comprising a 23.7% total
share in electricity production. In 2017, a staggering 33.1% of all German electricity was
produced by renewables.123 Such a rapid expansion of RES has also placed a tremendous
burden on those most impacted by the policy: average German citizens.
In addition to high industry expenses, Energiewende has placed a tremendous
financial burden upon German households. The cost of RES subsidies is met through a
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surcharge placed upon consumer energy bills, known as the “EEG-Umlage.”124 Even
more problematic, this surcharge has continued to rise over the years. In 2000, the
surcharge amounted to 0.2 cents per kilowatt hour.125 In 2012, the amount had increased
nearly twenty-fold, costing German consumers an additional 3.59 cents per kilowatt
hour.126 In 2017, the EEG Umlage amounted to 6.8 cents per kilowatt hour.127
Additionally, the EEG-Umlage is not the only energy tax levied on German citizens.
Consumers also pay an “eco-tax on fuel and gas” as well as “a share of electricity grid
connection costs.”128 As a result, energy bills have become among the most expensive
German household costs. In 2016, the average German spent 1,060 euros annually on
electricity; a 50% increase from 2007 levels.129 Such figures are even more pronounced
on a national level. In 2013, German consumers paid a total of 20 billion euros altogether
from wind, solar, and biomass plants. The industry costs of the electricity produced from
said plants, however, amounted to a mere 3 billion euros.130
In the aftermath of the rapid increase in RES electricity costs, the term “energy
poverty” has become commonplace when discussing Energiewende and the effects of the
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policy.131 In 2015, the German government released data revealing that between 2011 and
2015, over 300,000 German households had their power cut off due to unpaid electricity
bills.132 Since the start of the energy transition policy, Germans have witnessed to the
transformation of electricity as a luxury good. Despite recent price hikes in the form of
RES surcharges on energy bills, the German government has not adjusted government
pensions or social welfare program payments. As a result, “every new fee becomes a
threat to low-income consumers.”133 Long-term projections reveal more problems for
German citizens. The Karlsruhe Institute of Technology has predicted that wholesale
electricity prices will be even higher in 2025.134 Thus, the German energy innovation, it
appears, is bleeding German citizens through unparalleled high energy costs, without
clear indication of any relief in sight.

Denuclearization and Energy Consumption
Many of the current difficulties regarding Germany’s Energiewende policy can be
summarized by two particularities: the decision to phase out all nuclear energy, and the
decision to massively expand RES at a time when the technology was still relatively
expensive. By phasing out nuclear energy, Germany is forced to rely upon additional,
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more traditional energy sources until more of its gross electricity consumption can be
reliably obtained from RES. This further aim has paradoxically seen the growth of coal
and natural gas in Germany since 2010. An increase in domestic coal production, in order
to offset the nuclear phase out policy, has caused the rise of Germany’s greenhouse gas
emissions. In both 2013 and 2015, Germany’s emissions levels saw slight increases from
previous years.135 In addition to the rise of coal as an offset to denuclearization, Germany
is also witnessing the rise of energy consumption. The German energy consumption data
from 2017 reveals a one percent increase compared to 2016 levels.136 This increase in
energy consumption not only adds to the difficulty in meeting the consumption reduction
goal, but also leads to further difficulty with another key Energiewende goal: 20% energy
consumption reduction by 2020.

First Mover Wager
The decision to pursue a massive expansion of renewables while the technology
was still relatively expensive, is best summarized as Germany’s “first mover wager.” By
creating an energy transformation based on RES, Germany is ultimately testing the
resolve of a theory which champions that policies can predict and control markets.
Although Energiewende was launched when RES technology was still a fringe market,
Germany today constitutes a huge portion of the global renewable market. Currently,
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Germany employs nearly 400,000 workers in the renewable energy industry. 137
Moreover, Germany is home today to over 3,200 large scale renewable energy
companies, including, most notably, the German Engineering Federation or
VDMA.138All of which maintain vested interests in ensuring the continuation of
Germany’s energy transformation. Thus, the first mover theory holds that if the
renewable energy market continues to grow, alongside widespread renewable technology
proliferation, Germany will be the premier global investor in RES, maintaining a
significant portion of the renewable market. There remain, however, significant
disadvantages to Germany’s current wager.
The first mover disadvantages, conversely, risk Energiewende evaporating into
the past as a cautionary tale of placing policy before markets. By rushing the global pace
of change, Germany could suffer a remarkable disadvantage through its historically high
subsidies for wind, solar, and biomass electricity generation. Such subsidies that have
been placed largely on the shoulders of average German households run the risk of
regretting the cost. Solar power, for example, has seen significantly high subsidy costs in
Germany since 2010. In turn, solar energy has seen technological proliferation that
countries like China and the US have been happy to exploit at the expense of German
renewable subsidies. Furthermore, by crafting an energy policy built upon RES before
global markets indicated a favorable outcome for renewable investments, Germany has,
in effect, rolled the dice on the future of its energy supply and security. Even more
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problematic, data is beginning to emerge that reveals the improbability of
Energiewende’s long-term success.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Levels
In January 2017, German economist Heiner Flassbeck released an article
outlining fundamental misconceptions and flaws inherent in Germany’s Energiewende.
Flassbeck argued that the elimination of both nuclear power and fossil fuels, opting
instead to rely upon mainly wind and solar energy, is simply not feasible according to
weather patterns and long-term trends.139 According to Flassbeck, weather irregularities
that left Germany with insufficient wind and solar energy in December 2016, point to a
more macro level trend. Specifically, that Germany will never be able to solely rely upon
renewable energy, regardless how much new capacity is built in the future.140 Flassbeck
is not alone in his skepticism. Many economists, policymakers, government officials, and
industry titans have been quick to dismiss Energiewende as an impending failure. Among
the most cited examples of Energiewende’s thus far failure is Germany’s current
emissions level, as well as its continued reliance upon lignite, or brown coal, and Russian
natural gas.
Germany has thus far learned a critical lesson in energy sourcing and subsidies.
Namely, that spending an immense amount of money to subsidize a small output of
electricity generation through renewables is not an effective method to lower carbon
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emissions.141 Energiewende doubles the EU-wide goal of emissions reduction, outlining a
40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions by 2020. Data from 2017 reveals that
currently, Germany has seen a 30% decrease in its emissions from 1990 levels. This
means that, in order to meet its emissions target goal, Germany must reduce its emissions
by nearly 10% in the next two years.142 Scientists and policymakers alike agree this
prospect is dim. Yet in the time span between 2017 and Germany’s target date of 2020,
renewable energy subsidies are set to increase from 13.5 billion euros per year, to 15
billion euros per year.143 The reasons for this paradox are compelling, and illustrate the
Energiewende correlation fallacy between increased RES subsidies and lowered CO2
emissions levels.
One of the largest barriers to the Energiewende emissions reduction goal has
been the continued growth and reliance upon coal. To be sure, Germany’s persistent
dependence on coal is due to a multitude of factors including: industry pressure, the
potential fallout of dramatic job losses from coal industries, and the 2011 nuclear phase
out policy. In 2010, RES investments in Germany totaled 10 billion euros, and the
industry employed an estimated 370,000 German workers.144 Even more, coal industry
figures from 2016 revealed that although renewables accounted for 29% of power output,
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German power plants burning imported hard coal accounted for 17% of electricity
generation. Even more problematic, brown coal mines, or lignite, accounted for 23% of
power output in Germany in 2016.145 Additionally, the economic benefits of lignite, a
particularly cheap and abundant European source, has allowed for brown coal to become
the leading source of electricity when weather prevents reliance upon wind and solar.146
The effects of the nuclear phase out also dictate an increased reliance upon
imported hard coal, as well as domestic brown coal production. In 2016, nuclear energy
accounted for 13% of German power. By 2022, following the retirement of Germany’s
last nuclear reactors, the country will face a significant energy void to fill. If history is
any indicator, Germany is likely to continue to turn to the coal industry to account for this
gap. Furthermore, many of Germany’s policy peculiarities have provided little incentive
to eliminate coal plants throughout the country. Because German law stipulates that RES
receives priority access to the electricity grid, most of the excess electricity Germany
transports to its European neighbors comes from the source of lowest grid priority:
coal.147 This, coupled with the cheap cost of trading permits for carbon emissions
throughout Europe, has given little incentive for German coal plants to shut down.148 The
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continued growth and survival of Germany’s coal industry, therefore, will remain one of
the largest impediments to reaching the Energiewende emissions reduction goals.

Electricity Grid
In addition to difficulties with a nuclear phase out and a RES “first mover wager,”
the German energy revolution has witnessed profound grid problems. Renewable energy
imposes additional grid requirements on a country for three key reasons. First, some RES,
such as wind power, are typically far from the centers of energy demand, best
exemplified in offshore wind farms.149 This is due to the economic considerations of
RES, where cost and placement of renewable technology reign supreme over
consumption center concerns.150 Second, renewable energy generation is more widely
distributed than traditional power such as coal or nuclear energy.151 Renewable energy
generation typically requires more transport unless it is used locally. Third, renewable
energy output can replace traditional energy to a limited extent, but backup capacity will
remain necessary for still or cloudy days.152 Mixing energy sources puts an additional
strain on electricity grids. Such constraint requires grid advancements to allow for
fragmented renewable energy production. Furthermore, Germany’s electricity grid was
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originally designed for a centralized approach to energy transmission and consumption,
which included a variety of non-renewable sources.153 This has led to a variety of
structural considerations as well as transportation concerns.
Germany’s grid problems did not begin with Energiewende, but were evident
years prior as Germany began outlining its clean energy ambitions. In 2005, the German
government began discussing necessary modernizations to both the country’s
transmission and distribution grids.154 Transmission grids are used to transport more
electricity along longer distances at a high voltage. These grids have become of central
importance since Germany’s energy transformation and increased reliance upon RES,
which are often located far from consumption centers. Distribution grids, conversely,
involve electric lines with a lower voltage, used for local electricity transport. Both grid
systems in Germany have been criticized in recent years, as being outdated and illequipped for the country’s proposed RES advancements. In 2005, the German
government estimated that it would need to expand its high voltage transmission grid an
additional 850 kilometers.155 By 2010, a total of only 90 kilometers had been expanded.
The same year, the German government published a second study which revealed the
need for a 36,000-kilometer addition to the high voltage line, by 2020.156
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Germany’s low voltage distribution grid system has also been of central
importance since its increase in renewable dependence. The distribution grid has
increasingly become the central nervous system through which solar power flows.
Currently, solar power produces low voltage electricity and therefore must be connected
to the distribution grid.157 Wind turbines are also currently connected to the distribution
grid, though it is predicted that as the turbines grow in generation capacity, they will need
to be transferred to the transmission grid.158 Accordingly, the distribution grid will
require modernization to account for increasing solar electricity generation. Chief among
these modernizations will be bi-directional capability. This will ensure that low voltage
renewable electricity can flow both from households generating it, as well as buying from
it.159 A 2011 monitoring report revealed that German distribution grid systems now
accommodate more generating capacity than transmissions systems.160 However, it
remains unclear if the distribution grid can shoulder this heavy load. As of 2015, only
30% of the power lines outlined in the 2009 Power Grid Expansion Act have been
completed.161
Germany’s inadequate grid system is causing another financial problem for
Energiewende: renewable power curtailment.162 Per German law, electricity produced
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from renewable energy is given priority grid access. However, under certain conditions,
the network operator can “scale back priority feed-in from these installations temporarily
if the network capacities are not sufficient to transport the total amount of electricity
generated.”163 Thus far, this is exactly the grid predicament Germany is facing.
Germany’s grid system has so far failed in adequately connecting many of its wind farms
in the northern part of the country, to consumption centers in the south.164 This, in turn,
has led to a rising level of renewable power curtailment. In 2014, Germany reached a
new peak of renewable power curtailment, losing 1.16% of all renewable energy
electricity. This was a particularly shocking revelation, as it totaled more than all
renewable power curtailment from the previous four years combined.165 Altogether, the
renewable energy curtailment in 2014 cost Germany more than 82 billion euros.166 The
grid concerns and costs do not stop there. A 2015 German government report outlined a
projected 6.6 billion euro project to be undertaken over the next ten years on “grid
optimization and reinforcement projects” for distribution system operators. An additional
2.6 billion euros was slated to be invested in the high voltage transmission network over
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the same period.167 Thus, it appears RES investments and high priced energy bills were
just the beginning of Energiewende’s worrisome price tag. The true cost, data shows, lies
literally underneath, buried below in Germany’s underground, outdated electricity grid
system.

Renewable Energy Source Development in Germany
Despite numerous problems and setbacks, Energiewende has proven to be a
success in several areas. Today, renewable energy sources account for over 30% of
Germany’s total electricity consumption, a stunning feat by global comparison.168 By
contrast, renewable energy sources comprised only 10% of total energy consumption the
United States in 2016.169 Thus far, Germany has been able to devastate the myth that
renewable sources that seek to harness nature are too unreliable or unstable to generate a
notable percentage of a country’s total electricity generation. Furthermore, Germany has
seen such a transition occur in less than a decade. To an industry that measures
investments in “half-century increments,” Germany has revealed that an energy transition
is not only possible, but can be conducted in rapid fashion. Additionally, Germany is
slated to meet one of its three target goals by 2020: the achievement of a total of 35%
gross electricity consumption to come from renewable sources by 2020. In 2017, a total

167

Jeff St. John, “As Germany Curtails Wind and Solar, Billion-Euro Grid Projects Help
Bring More Green Power On-Line,” Greentech Media, April 28, 2016,
https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/as-germany-curtails-wind-and-solarbillion-euro-grid-projects-seek-to-bring#gs.3Je0S2E.
168
Jeffrey Ball, “Germany’s High-Priced Energy Revolution,” Fortune, March 14, 2017,
http://fortune.com/2017/03/14/germany-renewable-clean-energy-solar/.
169
U.S. Energy Information Administration, “How Much US Energy Consumption and
Electricity Generation Comes from Renewable Energy Sources?,” accessed January 16,
2018, https://www.eia.gov/tools/faqs/faq.php?id=92&t=4.
60

of 30.7% of gross electricity consumption came from RES in Germany.170 This is a
remarkable achievement for the country.

Energiewende in Public Polls
Despite analysis that reveals increasing German energy bill costs associated with
subsidy surcharges, the energy transformation policy still enjoys relative widespread
public support. A 2017 poll revealed that 88% of German citizens responded positively to
the question: “Do you generally approve of the Energiewende.”171 A total of 9% partially
agreed, and only 3% disagreed.172 These percentages reveal an increase in public support
since 2014, when only 85% of those surveyed acknowledged an approval of the energy
transition.173 A majority of 75% of those surveyed said they “want to actively take part in
making the energy transition happen,” indicating Germany’s success with its “bottomup” approach to the Energiewende.174 Although, almost two-thirds of those surveyed
agreed that the cost of Energiewende has not been fairly allocated between average wage
earners, businesses, and wealthy individuals.175 This concern with increasing energy
costs, and the disproportionate burden shouldered onto ordinary German households, has
remained a central criticism of Energiewende. Indeed, the disproportionate costs of
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Germany’s energy transition, as well as its continued and increased reliance upon lignite
and hard coal, and continuing dependence on Russian natural gas, are problems even avid
supporters of the German Energiewende cannot ignore.176

Policy Crossroads
The Energiewende policy is at a crossroads. As the first target goal year
approaches, current data suggests Germany is on track to meet only one of its three target
goals. Namely, 35% gross electricity consumption from renewable sources by 2020. The
other two target goals of a 40% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions and a 20%
reduction in energy consumption by 2020, appear improbable. Yet, many agree that
Germany’s progress thus far has been nothing short of remarkable. Germany currently
leads Europe in RES integration and investment. Since the introduction of the feed-in
tariff in 2000, promotion of renewables in Germany has skyrocketed. In the eighteen
years between the inception of the feed-in tariff to today, renewable generation has grown
almost 30%.177 In just a decade between 2007 and 2017, renewable power has increased
18% in Germany.178 This is evidence of a green power transition. However, this has come
at a tremendous cost, both in the form of RES subsidies, grid modernizations, and
expansions. Many remain doubtful that the gap left by the abandonment of nuclear power
can be reliably filled by renewables. Furthermore, Germany’s energy consumption
remains largely unchanged since 2000, and its continued reliance upon coal lingers,
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thwarting its emissions reduction goal.179 The likely 2020 target goal failures are likely to
linger throughout the country, and poses the potential to halt the policy altogether.
Alongside the complex and seemingly contradictory nature of the current state of
Germany’s energy transition policy, the policy has thus far failed to prove it can be an
affordable model for Europe. The proposed cost of grid modernization and expansion
alone totals more than several Central and Eastern European state GDPs. One journalist
likened the German energy transition to a heart-transplant: “A worthy endeavor,
undoubtedly, but one that remains unattainable for all but the very wealthiest.”180 For the
EU, this is bad news. The Union has sought its own energy transition policy, albeit at a
far more moderate rate than Germany. The success or failure of Energiewende’s target
goals, as well as the price tag of a rapid energy transition, could lead other European
countries to shy away from future environmental policies. Should Energiewende fail to
meet its short-term policy goals, as data suggests it is likely to, Germany risks being an
“example of international bad policy.”181 This could leave Germany with a credibility
problem in the future. Thus far, the German strategy of subsidy and first mover risk
remains a uniquely expensive German solution to the world’s impending energy crisis.
Overall, the impending failure of Germany to meet two of its three target goals for
2020 will create widespread problems for the future of Energiewende. Such a failure will
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not only call into question the intermediate and long-terms goals of the policy, but the
policy itself. The cost of Energiewende has been deemed worthwhile by the German
public and policymakers alike on the assumption the policy was succeeding. Justifying a
20 billion euro increase in energy bills annually on a one-third success rate will become
increasingly challenging. Additionally, European support for Energiewende remains at
risk as the policy continues to present economic strain and difficulties. Furthermore, the
likely failure of Energiewende’s two target goals for 2020 will only increase the
likelihood that future target goals, in both 2030 and 2050, will be unmet. Such unmet
targets of Energiewende carries with it the potential for a wide-ranging energy policy and
security conundrum.
Altogether, the cost analysis of Energiewende, as well as key concerns relating to
continued electric grid difficulties, hydrocarbons, and denuclearization combine to reveal
why Germany is currently projected to fail to meet two of its three stated policy goals for
2020. Current data reveals continued high cost projections, with minimal policy goal
success. Coal, particularly lignite, continues to abound throughout the country, and
ineffective grid systems still waste renewable energy production through power
curtailment. Furthermore, despite adopting an energy policy that seeks clean energy
independence, Germany continues to import Russian natural gas at high rates. Perhaps
most troubling of all, the cost of Germany’s energy transformation has led to a growing
energy affordability problem for many German citizens, with little promise for
improvement. The impending failure to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, as well as
energy consumption levels, will impact both Germany’s current international credibility,
as well as Energiewende’s intermediate and long-term policy goals. This includes
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Germany’s ability to continue to maintain public support for the policy in light of the
likely 2020 target goal failures. The next chapter will discuss the current state of
Energiewende’s intermediate and long-term policy goals, and how the likely short-term
goal failures discussed in this chapter could negatively impact the future of the energy
transformation policy.
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE FUTURE OF ENERGIEWENDE:
INTERMEDIATE AND LONG-TERM TARGET GOAL ANALYSIS

Germany’s Energiewende policy has reached a moment of profound evolution.
With the first target year, 2020, looming overhead, German policymakers have begun to
rethink and reshape some aspects of the policy. This is undoubtedly due to impending
short-term target goal failures, including the emission reduction goal, as well as the
energy consumption reduction goal. To begin, lawmakers have initiated the long overdue
process of restructuring renewable subsidies, and retiring the feed-in tariff system. In its
place, German policymakers have adopted an auction-based system for new and future
RES contracts. Additionally, Germany has also begun to reconsider the ownership
structure of RES throughout the country. Signs of a shift away from citizens’
cooperatives, in favor of a more industry-based ownership, are beginning to emerge. The
declared need for an international carbon tax going forward has also reached new heights
in the Energiewende debate, as Germany has repeatedly been confronted with its
paradoxical continued reliance upon hydrocarbons such as coal. Indeed, policymakers
and citizens alike are beginning to vocally challenge this central tension within
Germany’s current energy transformation. Altogether, these facts reveal that the energy
transition policy is itself in transition. The future of Germany’s Energiewende hangs in
the balance, where politicians, policymakers, and average citizens have begun to reconceptualize and restructure the energy policy. Reforms made in the coming years, and
their outcomes, carry tremendous consequence for the energy transition policy. The
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success or failure of such reforms holds with it the future of energy policy and security in
Germany.

Feed-in Tariff and Auction Based System
The future of Energiewende will depend foremost upon the continued cost of the
policy. Indeed, the expense of Energiewende has remained at the forefront of debate in
Germany. Thus far, Energiewende has been able to prove that a rapid growth in
renewable technology is possible. Since 2000, the “feed-in tariff” has allowed for a
massive RES expansion, as Germany paid generously to subsidize renewables.182 Indeed,
this has been the price tag of Germany’s “first mover wager” on renewable energy.
Energiewende chose to introduce the feed-in tariff at a time when solar and wind power
still far outpriced hydrocarbons. However, in the years since, renewables have begun to
ride the “downward cost curve associated with the global learning curve.”183 Put simply,
as investment and increased electricity share in renewables have grown in Germany, the
costs have begun to decrease. Even this seeming financial benefit, however, is not
without issues. The problem lies within the tariff timeline. Germany did not expect the
technical progress of RES to outpace the 20-year price guarantee written in the policy
contracts. However, this is precisely what happened. Accordingly, the German
government has begun to confront the costly issue of subsidies, and what can be done.
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In 2017, German policymakers sought to address the subsidy issue through a
reform of the Renewable Energy Act (EEG). The reform of the Act, which created the
feed-in tariff, seeks to do away with the tariff system it created.184 In place of the feed-in
tariff system, a new system of auctions has been developed in order to both keep a handle
on the amount of renewable capacity added to the grid system each year, and introduce a
market-based mechanism to support the continued growth of renewable energy
investments. The auction based approach to subsidizing renewables seeks to drive down
the price of RES subsidies through a system of bids. The auction system works by the
German government first setting a target level of investment in renewable energy
capacity. The government then allocates this set level of contracts to the lowest
bidders.185 As opposed to the auction based system, feed-in tariffs have traditionally been
set high above the market electricity price. The auction based system, however, seeks to
reduce subsidy costs by prompting competition.186 This is accomplished through the
simple, market-based approach to offering RES contracts only to those who bid the
cheapest price.187 This reform is a vital step toward a RES market economy. Such a
system is also intended to ease the costs of renewables on German consumers, while
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allowing the government greater control over the pace of RES expansion.188 Indeed, the
rapid pace of RES expansion in Germany has become a particularly concerning problem
in recent years.
In a cruel twist of fate, the only target goal Energiewende is on track to meet has
become a liability for Germany. The use of feed-in tariff incentives caused the explosion
of renewable energy technology, particularly in the last decade. However, an insufficient
grid system has left Germany unable to connect a significant amount of renewable
generated electricity to the consumers. As a result, a massive amount of RES energy is
being wasted, while Germany continues to see the expansion and growth of renewables
that is cannot accommodate. In 2015, for example, northern Germany produced 4,100
kilowatt hours of excess energy that could not be transported to the south.189 Enough
energy, it was estimated, to provide 1.2 million German households with energy for a
year.190 This is precisely the problem Germany is attempting to resolve by setting a target
level of RES investment thereby regaining some control over RES expansion.
The Renewable Energy Act reform stipulates “deployment corridors” for each
renewable technology.191 For example, an annual cap of 2.5 gigawatts of solar capacity
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will be installed, of which 600 megawatts is set to be auctioned.192 Onshore wind
installations, conversely, will be set at 2.8 gigawatts of annual installation.193 The
overgrowth of Germany’s windfarm sector has become of particular concern since 2015.
In 2016, it was reported that wind power had so congested the grid, the Germany
government was forced, in some cases, to pay RES companies to turn off wind
turbines.194 Such problems, it is theorized, would not occur under a deployment corridor
cap. German policymakers have remained adamant that the shift to an auction system is
the last hope of a sustainable energy transition going forward into the future.195 Others,
however, remain fearful that the auction system will prevent citizen participation in the
energy transition, shifting the advantage to corporations. This, in turn, reveals another
problem with the future of Energiewende: the tension between national targets and
decentralized responsibilities.

Ownership Structure
Germany’s Energiewende has been praised for its decentralized supply structure,
and utilization of citizens’ energy cooperatives. Indeed, this has been one of the
fundamental characteristics of the energy transition. However, the 2017 policy switch to
an auction system of RES contracts is likely to change the entire structure of
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Energiewende. This change almost certainly spells disaster for the future of
Energiewende. According to a 2012 study conducted by the Leuphana University of
Luneburg, nearly half of Germany’s installed biogas, wind, and solar capacity was owned
by citizens.196 This has as much to do with the feed-in tariff incentives as it does with the
roots of the German anti-nuclear and environmental movements.197 What was thought to
be a monopolistic market at the outset, has grown into a polypolistic German energy
market. With recent changes to the feed-in tariff system, however, and its replacement
with an auction system, the formerly guaranteed prices of RES investments are no longer.
This has caused considerable constraint in future RES investments by cooperatives. 198
The future of citizen participation in the Energiewende, therefore, hangs in the balance.
Citizen participation in Energiewende entails far more than public support. Even
at the inception of the policy, Energiewende enshrined the importance of “personal
responsibility and ordinary citizens” as the key to the policy’s overall success.199 A large
component of what made the Energiewende policy unique was not only its rapid timeline
for RES dependency, but also its use of and praise for “bottom-up activism from
municipal companies and citizens cooperatives” in support for the low carbon
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ambition.200 The power of the average German citizen was most evident in the ownership
structure of RES technology in the first years following the launch of Energiewende. By
the end of 2010, the first year of the energy transition policy, private citizens, largely
cooperatives, owned 40% of Germany’s total 53 gigawatts of installed renewable energy
capacity.201 German farmers accounted for an additional 11%, and project developers
owned 14%.202 Energy companies owned a mere 13.5%, while banks and investment
funds owned only 11%. Commercial companies, largely the wood sector, owned a total
of 9% of Germany’s installed renewable energy capacity.203
Following changes to the feed-in tariff system, many began to express fear that
the auction system would favor more corporate ownership. After the Renewable Energy
Act reform passed in January 2017, the German economic and energy ministry issued a
statement declaring the desire to continue to ensure a “high level of diversity” in RES
ownership, to include citizens’ cooperatives. This was cited as one of the three goals of
the auction system, the other two being “the ability to plan the energy transition,” and “to
keep costs down by introducing competition.”204 Through the newly established auction
system, cooperatives and small citizen owners face the risk of not only losing the auction,
by losing the initial investment cost as well.205 Many Germans have begun to view the
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reform as a veiled attempt by the government to assure the survival of large utility
companies that have come under attack in recent years.206 Energiewende, therefore,
currently runs the risk of either isolating citizens’ cooperatives, historically seen as the
backbone of the energy transition policy, or pushing utility companies “over the
brink.”207 How well German policymakers can maintain this balance is likely to affect the
entire success of Energiewende.

Government Structure
The tension between national targets and the historical decentralized RES
ownership structure has led to another anxiety of the energy transition policy. Germany’s
governmental organization, and in particular the concerning lack of coordination between
multi-level governmental structures regarding energy policies. This debate has emerged
in the context of Energiewende’s most recent modifications. The concern lies within
Germany’s multi-level policy structure, and the cross-level implementation of energy
transition policies. Energiewende arose as a national policy, with national targets. The
policy was passed into law in 2010 by the German parliament. Thus, at the inception of
the energy transition policy, Germany utilized a top-down strategy of policy. However,
the implementation of the policy, including a majority of the RES ownership structure,
occurred at the subnational level.208 This includes the sixteen states of the German
Republic, known as the Lander, all of which have crafted additional subnational
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renewable energy policies.209 The problem, then, is concerned with whether federal, or
national energy transition policies are reinforced by subnational policies. Or, conversely,
if such tensions between national and subnational energy policies reveal a disconnect, or
misalignment.210
The difference in subnational energy policies is due to different subnational, or
statewide, concerns and priorities across the country. Germany’s federal states face
different geographical and demographical structures, which leads to varying priorities.
Additionally, some states have sought a key leadership role in the country-wide energy
transition, thereby adopting more innovative statewide energy policies.211 Presently, the
current multi-level governance structure of Germany’s energy policy is not providing for
the necessary incorporation of both national and subnational policies. Such a constraint
has led to the reevaluation of the horizontal and vertical governmental and policy
elements of the energy transition. Unless changes are made to the current implementation
of Energiewende, and its marriage to subnational energy policies and priorities, Germany
risks a lack of cohesion in cross-country energy policy adoption that could lead to the
destruction of the Energiewende policy.
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Carbon Tax
The future of Germany’s energy transition policy also depends upon the country’s
ability to phase out hydrocarbons. This has led to outcry among many German
policymakers for an international carbon tax. The sustained use of hydrocarbons in
Germany, particularly lignite and hard coal, continues to abound, due in part to the
simple fact that its usage still makes financial sense. This is owing, many argue, to the
thus far failure to introduce any meaningful carbon taxation, or national carbon floor
price.212 In 2017, experts estimated that it would take a carbon tax price of 30 euros per
ton of CO2 in order for Germany to abandon hard coal in favor of natural gas.213 A price
of 50 euros per ton of CO2 would be necessary in order for Germany to switch from
brown coal, or lignite, to gas.214 Presently, the European Union’s Emissions Trading
Scheme (ETS) has set the price at 5 euros per ton.215 Many argue that the implementation
of a steeper German carbon tax is the only way to ensure the abandonment of dirty,
carbon emitting sources, thereby allowing Germany a chance to meet its intermediate and
long-term emissions reduction goals. Such a tax, however, remains a distant dream for
many Germans. This is due, in large part, to the political considerations of the German
coal industry. Indeed, phasing out coal, as a higher carbon tax would intend to do, carries
with it serious political considerations. To begin, Germany is abundant in soft coal, or
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lignite. It is estimated that nearly 5 billion tons of soft coal are accessible in the country,
through both existing and planned future mines.216 Furthermore, the coal industry
accounts for roughly 40% of the total energy produced in Germany, and generates over
30,000 jobs.217
Germany will likely continue to rely upon lignite and hard coal due to both
economic considerations, as well as political ones. Presently, a proposed higher carbon
tax has failed to generate momentum both in Germany as well as internationally. The
international problem of carbon taxation is clear. Unlike sulfur dioxide, carbon emissions
do not stay within national borders.218 CO2 is a global pollutant, and even proponents of
a carbon tax understand the market implications if only certain countries adopt a steep
carbon tax. Thus, should Germany adopt a high carbon price, it would only serve to
decrease German competitiveness, while making emissions suddenly cheaper in
neighboring countries.219 In order to circumvent such a problem, an international carbon
tax would need to be adopted. For Germany, the problem is simple: the slowest countries
would drive the timeline.220 To a country that has adopted the most rapidly paced energy
policy ever before witnessed, this is unacceptable.
Without the framework of a significantly increased carbon tax in Germany, the
value of coal, and particularly lignite, will persist. The implications of this conundrum are
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clear. Energiewende will remain unable to meet its lowered CO2 emissions goal so long
as hydrocarbons are still favored. In order for hydrocarbons to fall out of favor in
Germany, a steep carbon tax, roughly 50 euros per ton of CO2, would need to be adopted.
Following such a steep carbon tax, German policymakers would likely face severe
political backlash from the lignite and hard coal industries. Indeed, such political debate
regarding the coal industry had led to the continued prosperity of coal in Germany, even
after the launch of Energiewende. The variability of renewables has remained a central
problem in the energy transition, as Germany has continued to look to the coal industry to
fill the gaps left by RES. Until such a choice is no longer politically and economically
viable, Germany is likely to continue its reliance upon coal, particularly lignite. This, in
turn, will make Energiewende’s intermediate and long-term goals for emissions reduction
out of reach. Long-term emissions reduction success of Energiewende depends upon an
international carbon tax that is years, if not decades, away from universal acceptance and
agreement.221 Thus, it appears the Energiewende policy may have found an unstoppable
force upon which it cannot overcome: global politics. As German policymakers continue
to focus on intermediate and long-terms goals, in light of impending 2020 target goal
failures, the need for reform of Germany’s hydrocarbon dependence will come to the
forefront of the debate, without any clear potential for resolution.

221

Germany proposed an international carbon tax rate at the G20 summit meeting in
2017. However, the biggest opponents include the US and China, both of which would
have to agree before any international carbon tax would carry meaning.
77

Potential Flashpoints
The key next steps of the Energiewende policy will require immense
infrastructure development throughout the country. This, in turn, has sparked an old but
important problem in Germany: the phenomenon known as “Not in my backyard” or
Nimbyism.222 Many observers have begun to wonder if Nimbyism carries with it the
potential to thwart the future of Energiewende altogether. As RES ownership data and the
decentralized structure of the energy transition reveal, citizen cooperation and support has
remained central to the policy’s implementation and success. Although large-scale
support for Energiewende continues to abound, resistance has formed over various
aspects of the policy. Large-scale infrastructure projects, such as grid expansion and the
construction of biomass plants across the country, have become a major point of
contention in recent years.223 Sizable wind and solar parks have also been of key concern,
as they continue to proliferate across the German countryside.
The concerns regarding future infrastructure development are varied. Many
German citizens have expressed concern over plummeting property values, due to close
proximity to wind turbines, power masts, or above ground transmission cables.224 Others
cite health and environmental concerns as well as damage to tourist appeal in local
economies.225 Infrastructure development, particularly grid expansion, is seen by many
German policymakers and experts as the most crucial step forward, in order for the
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country to meet its 2035 target goal of 55% RES power generation.226 Concerns over grid
expansion, however, have been widespread in even the most Energiewende-supportive
German states. In 2014, Bavaria was ranked number one in terms of its overall
performance in the energy transition.227 By 2015, however, mass protests had erupted
across the state over planned future power lines.228 Concern over infrastructure, and the
next stages of the Energiewende reveal potential cracks in the foundation of the policy.
Although the financial costs of Germany’s energy transition policy have been debated for
some time, the social cost of the policy is just beginning to be felt. Such criticism could
have the potential to topple the necessary next stages of the policy before a single
additional power line or plant is erected.
Alongside “Nimbyism” resistance to grid expansion, Germany’s proposed grid
modernization and expansion projects could also prove problematic for the future of
Energiewende. As the energy transition policy moves into its next stages of
implementation, the success of continued and furthered RES reliance will depend largely
upon Germany’s ability to make necessary grid adjustments. The current debate on grid
expansion has something for everyone. Consumers want to ensure a dependable energy
supply, at low prices. Energy suppliers need assurance infrastructure investments will
prove to be lucrative. Conservationists need to ensure expansion is environmentally
friendly, while locals expect property value protection.229 Thus, impending grid
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expansion will face a litany of social and political problems, as well as logistical
complications.
Currently, the future of RES development and dependence relies upon expansion
of the high-voltage transmission grid, as well as updates to the low-voltage distribution
grid system.230 Apart from being a costly proposition, both expansion to the transmission
grid, and modernization of the distribution grid will require country-wide support.
Additionally, Germany has historically endured problems with infrastructure realities
running contrary to environmentally ambitious policies.231 Before the genesis of
Energiewende, Germany had already begun to confront problems with its grid system.
Technical complications, mixed with political realities and local “Nimbyism” pushback
has proven to be a lethal combination for proposed grid modernizations in the past.
Germany has yet to prove it has a solution to such problems, further risking the future
success of the energy transition policy.
The Energiewende is currently in transition. With the 2020 targets goals
approaching, and the likely failures of two policy objectives, Germany’s next steps will
be critical to the survival of the energy transition policy. Policymakers have begun to
rethink many of the original constructs of the policy including the feed-in tariff, RES
ownership structure, and carbon taxation. The decision to replace the original feed-in
tariff system with an auction system in 2017 has been one of the most drastic alterations
of the origins of the Energiewende policy. This reform is likely to alter the ownership
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structure of RES contracts, favoring large industry and companies over citizens’
cooperatives. Such a change is likely to alter public support for the future of the policy.
Lack of public support for Energiewende would be a devastating blow to the policy, as it
has been recognized for its decentralized RES supply structure and diverse ownership.
Energiewende also risks the long-term policy goal failures associated with decreased
greenhouse gas emission levels. The continued use of coal, particularly lignite, in
Germany, has heightened the possibility of a new wave of Energiewende policy failures.
Presently, many German politicians are calling for an international carbon tax. However,
such an international taxation system is still many years away from adoption. In order for
Germany to meet its long-term emissions reduction goal, its cost-effective domestic
lignite production would need to face a much steeper financial penalty for its CO2
emissions. Until an international carbon tax can be adopted, this is unlikely.
Aside from the likely 2020 target goal failures, Energiewende’s most pressing
potential flashpoints lie in “Nimbyism” phenomenon, conceivable loss of public support,
and technical complications associated with infrastructure developments. The next steps
of Energiewende implementation require immense infrastructure development across
Germany. This includes grid expansion and construction of wind and solar parks as well
as biomass plants. Local pushback for such planned future developments has come from
a variety of groups including homeowners fearful of dwindling property values, and
conservationists fearful of environmental impacts. Thus, at the outset of Energiewende’s
next key steps, public support is nowhere near assured. Technical and financial risks are
also involved in the next phase of infrastructure development, as both the transmission
grid and the distribution grid are slated to be difficult and costly.
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Altogether, the future ahead for Energiewende is riddled with strife. The most
pressing issues will involve the infrastructure development needed to propel the policy
forward in accordance with its intermediate and long-term goals. Public support has
proven to be a key pillar of the energy transition policy, but recent pushback and local
protests reveal discontent with the recent changes and planned future installations.
Citizens concerned over Energiewende’s new auction-based contract system, declining
property values associated with infrastructure development, and the continued use of
lignite allude to a difficult road ahead for Germany’s energy transition. Government
structure in Germany, as well as the contentious debate regarding an international carbon
tax are also premier problems for Energiewende and Germany’s ability to meet both
intermediate and long-term policy goals. Thus, it appears both the 2020 target goals, as
well as the intermediate and long-term policy aims of Energiewende, are at risk for
disappointment. This disappointment, in turn, is likely to occur both domestically and
across the EU as a whole. The next chapter will discuss the implications an
Energiewende intermediate and long-term policy failure could have upon the EU, as well
as strategic implications for Germany going forward.
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CHAPTER FIVE
STRATEGIC IMPLICATIONS OF ENERGIEWENDE AND THE
FUTURE OF ENERGY SECURITY IN GERMANY AND THE EU

The future of Energiewende will likely reflect the future of energy policy and
security in Europe. As Germany continues its vulnerable march toward a renewable
energy transformation, its success or failure will render consequences both within and
beyond the German border. If Energiewende proves it cannot successfully transition
Germany into a low-carbon economy, the abandonment of the energy transition policy
will come with its own challenges. Such challenges will include the future of supply
security in Germany, and the EU, as well as EU decarbonization policies, energy
diversification prospects, and diminished flexibility in both German and EU-wide foreign
and defense policies. Thus, while the domestic implications of Energiewende as have
previously been analyzed are of vital importance, also critical to the policy are the ways
in which Energiewende can alter the landscape of energy security throughout Europe –
for either better or worse.
The strategic implications of the possibility of an Energiewende failure are vast.
Such a policy failure could lead to problems for Germany and Europe as a whole. The
energy transition was intended to not only solve environmental concerns relating to
climate change, but was also meant to signal an era of possibility. The possibility of clean
energy independence. Should Energiewende fail, the landscape of both European clean
energy and energy security would be in peril. Furthermore, landscape changes in energy
security could further upset the presently fragile balance of energy supplier relations in
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Europe. An increasingly aggressive Russian Federation can be seen as being emboldened
by its current assurance of regional importance as a key energy supplier. Should
Energiewende fail to signal to other European nations the possibility of decreased foreign
reliance, Russia is likely to continue to maintain its regional stronghold as the key
supplier. Such a stronghold, in turn, is likely to allow the Russian Federation to broaden
its regional footprint and widen its sphere of influence, as its EU neighbors continue to be
constrained from responding due to energy dependency. Alongside climate concerns, the
cardinal threat in energy policy facing the Eurozone today is the continued dependency
on Moscow for their energy future. This, in turn, means that energy security in Europe is
not just an economic or environmental issues – it is also an issue of national security for
Germany as well as the EU. Energiewende’s culpability in how a policy can effectively
offer a counter to Russian energy dependency, therefore, will be vast.
An Energiewende failure will also impact the future of energy policy and security
in the EU. Since 2010, all eyes have focused upon Germany to behold whether a nation
can successfully transition away from foreign imported hydrocarbons, into a low-carbon
economy without the aid of nuclear energy. Accordingly, German politicians and
policymakers have stressed the possibility of Energiewende as an international model for
energy transition policies.232 If Energiewende proves it is unable to export Energiewende
to the EU, many member states will be forced to reevaluate current and future climate
change goals and policies, as well as their likely impact on domestic energy security and
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supplier security. Altogether, the German Energiewende has been tasked with two
distinct burdens: transitioning Germany’s energy policy and economy, as well as setting
the tone for the future of EU-wide energy policies. Accordingly, the implications of
Energiewende’s success or failure, and its likely impact on the future of EU energy
security, are vital to consider.

Energiewende and German Foreign and Defense Policy
The outcome of Energiewende will not only affect Germany’s economic and
energy policies, but its foreign policy as well. Although the debate surrounding
Energiewende at the time of its launch in 2010 centered largely on domestic and
environmental concerns, the scope of the debate, and the implications of Energiewende
widened beginning in 2014. In many ways, 2014 was a watershed year for Europe.
Heightened Russian aggression, evidenced by the annexation of Crimea and tensions in
Ukraine, caused many European countries to increasingly question Russian energy and
supply dependency. Following concerns of foreign import reliance, Energiewende began
to take on a new, important role in German policy. In March 2014, the German Minister
of Foreign Affairs, Sigmar Gabriel, described the Energiewende as a “global project” that
will “enable us to reduce our dependence on oil and gas imports while reaching our
climate change targets.”233 The impact of Energiewende was no longer limited to energy
policy and climate change, but to international relations as well.
The relationship between Germany’s supply security and Energiewende has
remained of central importance to energy transition advocates. Energiewende has been
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called the “strategic imperative” for German supply security, through its emphasis on
diversification and decreased foreign dependency.234 In 2011, a study was undertaken for
Germany’s Armed Forces, the Bundeswehr, outlining the environmental dimensions of
security.235 The authors of the report recommend “a quick rollout of renewable energy” in
order to gain “more leeway in foreign policy.”236 Although Germany has historically
maintained good relations with Russia in accordance with its oil and gas needs, recent
years of increased aggression by the Russian Federation has led even countries such as
Germany to reconsider the implications of the future of its supply security. Energiewende
has been seen in recent years as one of the most promising policies regarding Germany’s
foreign policy vis-à-vis Russia. By advocating for a decreased need of foreign
hydrocarbon imports in the near future, Energiewende carries with it the potential for
greater German foreign policy flexibility vis-à-vis the Russian Federation. Relatedly,
should Energiewende fail, Germany will be faced with the prospect of continued or
increased foreign reliance on Russia for hydrocarbons. As recent years have shown an
increase in Russian willingness to engage and heighten regional tensions, an
Energiewende failure would prevent Germany from taking stronger defense stances
against the Russian Federation, in order to maintain supply security for foreign energy
imports.
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Energiewende and Russia
Since the launch of the Energiewende policy in 2010, the role of Russian
influence in German energy policy has been a point of concern. German government
officials with unusually close ties to the Kremlin, as well as the Nord Stream 2 project’s
volatile history of policymaker support in Germany, has led to questions surrounding
Energiewende’s prospects for success. While Germany enjoys a relatively stable
relationship with Russia, exemplified by pipeline cooperation and import price
stabilization, some have begun to wonder if this stable relationship between the two
European powers is undermining the Energiewende. Following the 2018 election and
coalition between the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the Christian Democratic
Union (CDU), the controversial Nord Stream 2 undersea pipeline connecting Russia to
Germany has gained new life and support. This is due, in large part, to the Social
Democratic Party’s stance that deepened economic ties with Moscow can diffuse tensions
between the East and West.237 Indeed, the SDP has a history of advocating for natural gas
contracts between the two countries dating back to the 1970s.238 In March 2018, the
German maritime authority, the Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency, approved
of the construction and operation for the pipeline to go forward.239 Although the future of
the pipeline project remains uncertain, the renewed support for Nord Stream 2 in
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Germany appears to run contrary to the energy transition model outlined in
Energiewende, which advocates for low carbon, energy independence.240
The renewed support for the Nord Stream 2 project in Germany has exposed
additional concerns regarding German government officials and their connections to
Russian energy companies. In August 2017, former Chancellor Gerhard Schroder
accepted a position as an independent director on the board of Rosneft, Russia’s largest
oil company.241 Additionally, Schroder has also been a board member of Russian
associations where Gazprom, Russia’s government-controlled gas giant company, is
either “the majority or sole shareholder.”242 Furthermore, in October 2017, Schroder was
appointed chairman of Nord Stream 2, which is led by Russia’s Gazprom.243 While
Schroder no longer plays an active role in Germany’s government, he is far from a fringe
figure. In June 2017, Schroder gave a speech at the Social Democratic Party convention
that was well-received by fellow party members.244 The speech was rebutted by the
Chairman of the German parliament’s foreign affairs committee, Norbert Rottgen, who
made a statement denouncing Schroder’s recent roles in Russian energy companies. He
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declared that, “Schroder’s involvement won’t improve relations between Germany and
Russia. On the contrary it will strain them. If he thinks he wants to ensure energy in
Germany, then I consider that a bad joke since he will be increasing Germany’s
dependence on Russia.”245
Although there is little evidence to support any corruption playing a decisive role
in the lack of Energiewende’s target goal successes, there remain warranted concerns
regarding the nature of German-Russian relations. Particularly the inherent contradiction
between Energiewende’s outlined energy goals, and continued reliance on Russia for
natural gas. The Nord Stream 2 pipeline project, as well as continued and deepened
natural gas ties between Russia and Germany, reveals an inherent paradox between the
Energiewende’s long-term goal of clean energy independence, and the geopolitical reality
in which Germany currently finds itself. Concerns also include the ability of the Russian
Federation to continue to exert its energy influence in the region aided by Germany’s
continued cooperation through pipeline projects and gas contracts, and the inability of
other EU member nations to effectively distance themselves from energy giants in
Moscow vis-à-vis Berlin. The EU’s ability as a whole to decrease its energy dependency
upon Russia lies at risk in the face of continued natural gas cooperation between
Germany and Russia, regardless of Energiewende target goals and strategic aims.
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Energy Diversification in the EU
Europe is looking for a way out of its current energy crisis. Presently, the
continent imports over half of the energy it consumes.246 This supply has been
characterized in recent years by regional instabilities and economic shocks that have
proven energy to be Europe’s foremost security issue. Collectively, the European Union
nations have striven to advance energy policies in recent years aimed at solving such a
crisis. The EU has centered largely on two main goals as a strategy to combat current
energy problems: diversification and decarbonization. Diversification refers to both
diverse suppliers as well as diverse sources. Decarbonization, meanwhile, has taken hold
in various EU countries, pursuing low-carbon energy policies and phase outs of
hydrocarbons. No national policy better encompasses both of these goals as Germany’s
Energiewende. The Energiewende seeks to diversify energy sources through a shift to
RES, while eliminating fossil fuels and pursuing a low-carbon economy for Germany in
the near future. The problem, then, is simple: the failure of Energiewende as a whole
could signal to Europe the unlikely future success of its diversification policy goals. Such
a failure could, in turn, cause an EU-wide splinter over the future of energy policy,
further damaging the European alliance at a moment of key vulnerability for the Union.
As Europe continues to watch Germany, the potential failure of Energiewende
could signal trouble ahead for EU and non-EU states seeking their own energy transition
and environmental policy. States seeking similar nuclear phase outs could hesitate, if
RES prove to be an unreliable gap fill. Currently, Energiewende has proven to be an
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option only available to the wealthiest countries. For many CEE nations, the energy
transition has already been labeled a non-starter. For those still awaiting results before
deciding, the approaching 2020 target failures are likely to further dissuade. An
Energiewende policy failure could also signal to Central and Eastern European states the
need for continued foreign reliance on coal, oil, and natural gas. A persistent Europeanwide reliance upon oil and gas, consequently, will mean the continued dominance of
Russia as a regional supplier. Accordingly, should Germany’s energy transition fail,
Europe’s dominant energy supplier, Russia, is likely to remain of central importance to
EU countries. The continued reliance upon Moscow for oil and natural gas has been seen
in recent years as the heart of the energy crisis, and a key source of regional instability
and turmoil.
However, if Germany is unable to launch a successful turn away from Russian
energy, this could signal to other EU nations, particularly Central and Eastern European
states, the need for continued dependence upon Moscow. Following the 2014 Russian
annexation of Crimea, and military involvement in separatist movements in eastern
Ukraine, the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies launched a study intended to analyze
regional options for reducing European dependence on Russian energy. The results of the
study were not encouraging. The authors found that the majority of European countries
possess a “limited scope” to reduce reliance on Russian gas, to the extent that it is
“replaced by coal power generation.”247 Further troubling, some countries in both the
Baltic region and south-eastern European states are likely to remain “extremely
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vulnerable” to Russian energy dependency and potential interruptions into the 2020s.248
The report ended its conclusions by stating that regardless of its geopolitical situation,
Russia, the EU, and individual European nations will face a “necessary continued natural
gas relationship” based on current Gazprom contracts, and the foreseeable future of
Europe’s energy needs.249
Germany’s Energiewende was one European response to the circumstances noted
in the Oxford Institute for Energy’s 2014 study. However, despite the Oxford Institute
report’s findings, several Central and Eastern European have begun to seek alternative
sources of energy, as well as means to block Russian energy dominance throughout the
continent. Although Germany has approved of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, the battle over
the pipeline represents the variety of EU attitudes regarding Russian gas supply to the
region. Since the inception of the gas line set to run parallel with Nord Stream 1, Nord
Stream 2 has caused an uproar in the Union. To begin, the project led by Russian gas
company Gazprom, involves not only Germany but Denmark, Finland, and Sweden as
well.250 This is due to the necessary building permits that each country must agree to for
the pipeline to run across the Baltic Sea.251 The pipeline, and more importantly its
operators, must also adhere to European Union law in accordance with energy and
environment regulations.252 Among the most concerning aspects of the Nord Stream 2
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project for many CEE nations is the pipeline’s bypassing of Ukraine. Many EU member
states, including Estonia, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, and Poland, have expressed vehement
opposition to the project on the grounds that it violates the EU’s energy vision.253 CEE
critics of the pipeline also argue that Nord Stream 2 will increase the region’s
dependency on Russian energy, expose the region to political pressures and gas cutoffs,
and damage Ukrainian revenue in transit fees.254
In addition to Nord Stream 2 opposition, several Central Eastern European nations
have sought energy diversification methods that alienate the Russian Federation. In
August 2017, Lithuania became the first “ex-Soviet state” to buy US gas.255 The
following year in November, Poland signed a five-year natural gas import deal with the
United States.256 These victories follow in the wake of the shale gas boom in the U.S.,
and the country’s newfound ability to export gas at economically competitive prices – a
significant feat in recent years.257 Such CEE diversification continues to be made possible
by the new and planned gas terminals throughout the region, which seek to increase
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interconnectivity, particularly in the Baltic region.258 Germany’s Energiewende,
therefore, does not hold the monopoly on European energy policies that seek to reduce
Russian energy influence in the region.
At first glance, Germany’s Energiewende appears to outline a contradictory
approach to energy independence and Russian gas imports. The energy transition outlines
a future of low-carbon, energy independence for Germany, but expects gas demand for
power production to peak around 2025.259 Only after, it is theorized, can wind and solar
technology replace LNG.260 Thus, although Germany has continued to express its desire
for Russian gas imports, most notably through the Nord Stream 1and 2 pipeline projects,
its national energy strategy still aims to produce 80% of its energy from RES by 2050. 261
The problem, then, lies in the future of Energiewende, should the policy fail. More
specifically, how the intersection of perceived Russian cooperation in Nord Stream 1 and
2, and the Energiewende policy of diversification and energy independence, will affect
German energy security.
If Germany is unable to meet its long-term goal of 80% RES by 2050, it will face
a continued reliance upon Russian LNG to fill the gap left in its energy needs that it was
unable to develop through increased RES. This future projection seems not only likely,
but imminent following the March 2018 Federal Maritime and Hydrographic Agency’s
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approval of the construction and operation of Nord Stream 2. Such a move is likely to
signal to other European countries their own continued dependency upon Russian energy
imports, or the likely failures that await them should they pursue policies that seek to
forgo Russian energy. Even more troubling, European countries unable to turn to largescale RES development due to cost constraints, but still desirous of a decreased
dependency on Russian gas, are likely to look instead to increased coal use, as the Oxford
study reported. The continued and increased use of dirty, CO2 emitting sources, such as
coal, in some European countries is likely to cause a future splinter in the EU as its
decarbonization goals risk continent-wide failure. Such a potential future splinter in EU
policy also involves conflicting views on Russian oil and natural gas supply to the region,
and the potential geopolitical and national security implications for the Union. Thus, EU
cohesion surrounding its energy policies is at risk should energy independence and
Union-wide decarbonization prove illusive.

Decarbonization in the EU
Decarbonization has remained a central European Union energy policy pillar
since the turn of the millennium. The EU has striven to take a leadership goal in climate
change policies for nearly five decades, and has adopted internal and external energy
policy initiatives including the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change and the
Kyoto Protocol.262 Both the Third Energy Package and the Roadmap 2050 strategy
envisioned decarbonization objectives for the EU. The 2030 framework adopted by the
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European Council in October 2014 includes the ambition for the EU to pursue a 40%
reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels by 2030.263 This was followed
by the 2015 Paris Agreement. Although the EU has outlined key decarbonization goals,
Germany’s Energiewende policy has charted the most far-reaching and fast-paced
decarbonization goals. Through its energy transition policy, Germany has sought a
leadership role within the European Union. By attempting to surpass the EU-wide
emissions reduction rate in nearly half the time, Germany has striven to prove that not
only is decarbonization attainable, but rapid decarbonization can be achieved.
Germany’s rapid decarbonization aim, outlined in its emissions reduction goals as
well as its RES dependency targets, is a key distinguishing feature of Energiewende.
Presently, Germany is not on track to meets its 40% emissions reduction goal by 2020.
This is due to a multitude of factors, including the continued use of hard coal and lignite,
as well as the intermittency problem of renewables.264 If Germany is unable to meet its
climate targets regarding greenhouse gas emissions, it not only risks its reputation as a
global climate leader, but its failure could also impact European climate cohesion as a
whole. Although decarbonization has grown in popularity throughout Europe in recent
years, numerous EU and non-EU member states have continued to pursue energy policies
that outline extensive fossil fuel dependency. A 2017 survey revealed that a total of
eleven European countries presently provide subsidies totaling over 80 billion euros
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annually to fossil fuel industries.265 They included: Czech Republic, France, Germany,
Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Sweden, and the UK.266
Presently, there is no single EU-consensus regarding the future of decarbonization
policies, and individual state implementation. Energiewende’s failure could do more than
just discourage European countries still undecided about future decarbonization policies.
An Energiewende failure could also further threaten to splinter EU attitudes regarding
fossil fuels and low-carbon economies. Such a splinter, in turn, could lead to a massive
shift in EU energy policies as well as the future of Union relations as a whole. If
Germany fails to meet its emissions reduction target goals, it could also signal just how
far off a low carbon economy could be for Europe. This, in turn, risks a reevaluation of
European Commission energy policies, including the 2030 framework as well as the
Roadmap 2050. Following recent Union-wide disagreement regarding the refugee crisis
as well as taxation, and regulatory overreach, energy may be one of the last areas
whereby consensus in the Union could be reached. An Energiewende failure risks this
potential EU energy policy cohesion.

EU Energy Policy Going Forward
In addition to alliance cohesion problems, the EU also faces policy agreement
barricades. This is due to the nature of the Union as a multi-nation body, and what is

265

Fiona Harvey, “European Countries Spend Billions a Year on Fossil Fuel Subsidies,
Survey Shows,” The Guardian, September 28, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/28/european-countries-spendbillions-a-year-on-fossil-fuel-subsidies-survey-shows.
266
Ibid.
97

known as the “plurality of actors problem.”267 The most recent expansion of the EU in
2004 saw the addition of predominately Eastern European states to the Union. This, in
turn, added a layer of complexity to EU energy policy. Generally, Western EU member
states have had a far different relationship with regional suppliers, pipeline connectivity,
and LNG contracts than their Eastern EU counterparts. Historically, Western EU member
states have seen the healthy development of a regional gas market to include storage
facilities, pipeline infrastructure, and “regasification terminals” which allow for
uninterrupted gas supplies to the region.268 This integrated market, in part, is one of the
key reasons Germany can continue to reliably depend upon Russia for its LNG supply,
before wind and solar are slated to take over. In Central and Eastern EU states, however,
a vastly more complex picture of energy persists.
Eastern gas markets have been slower to integrate. This stems from both
geographical and geopolitical considerations. CEE EU states do not bolster nearly the
infrastructure support necessary for an integrated gas market as Western European EU
states. Accordingly, it has made sense for countries in the region to turn to the nearest
local exporter, Russia, to supply its modest amount of gas demand.269 However, this has
not been without significant geopolitical consequence. Both Ukraine and Belarus have a
history of gas disputes with the Russian Federation, dating back to 2006. The argument,
particularly between Russia and Ukraine, has led Moscow to sporadically cut off all gas
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supplies to the country three times in eight years.270 Under these conditions of a lack of
supplier competition, arbitrary pricing has become “the rule more than the exception.”271
Instead, coal markets, and to a lesser extent oil markets, have reigned in Central and
Eastern Europe. Against a backdrop of a particularly Western European trend toward
decarbonization, and the historical and continued reign of coal in Eastern Europe, it is
reasonable to assess EU energy policy as an intricate maze.
Today, Western EU states approach energy policy and security from a far
different vantage point than their Eastern neighbor member states. This difference in
approach and outlook has made Union-wide energy policy adoption tremendously
difficult for the European Commission. Germany’s Energiewende is foremost a reflection
of Western EU energy policy and geopolitical positioning. The energy transition can
comfortably rely on Russia for much of its continued gas import, due in large part of the
well-integrated regional gas market. Decarbonization is seen as more attainable, due to
the financial capability of the German economy – the fourth largest in the world.
Diversification of sources, including the phase out of nuclear energy, has led to the
massive growth of RES technology and power generation in the last ten years.
Energiewende, then, is purely Western European in nature. The potential failure of the
energy transition policy, therefore, runs the risk of expanding the divide in the EU on
energy policy and security. Indeed, should Germany’s energy transition fail, many
Central and Eastern EU member states will be better able to assert the disconnect
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between EU energy policy goals and geopolitical realities. Furthermore, an Energiewende
failure could reveal to Western EU nations the danger in seeking a fast-paced
decarbonization policy. This has been one of the key points of agreement among Western
EU nations in recent years. A disparity of interests, politics, and outlooks exist in the
European Union. Recent years have seen major changes to the Union, including the UK
decision to leave, and formidable disagreements regarding social and economic policies.
Should Energiewende fail, energy policy may soon be the next great point of divide in the
EU.

EU Foreign and Defense Policy Implications
In November 2016, the European Union leaders met and agreed on a new EU
Global Strategy. The new strategy sought to replace the previous one dating back to
2003, and highlighted key changes in the threat environment, as well as new responses to
them. Among the most notable differences between the two strategies is the marked
change between the former security environment that was boasted as evidence of
“prosperity, security, and freedom,” to the new realization of increasing global
instabilities.272 Also noteworthy, is the EU’s decision to link the new threat environment
with “managing climate risk and the global energy transition.”273 The designation of
climate change risk as a security and defense concern echoed the Obama
Administration’s 2013 Climate Action Plan, and United States 2014 Quadrennial Defense
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Review, both of which concluded that impacts of climate change are “threat
multipliers.”274 Defense and security policies have finally caught up with the energy
crisis being felt across Europe. In particular, the 2016 EU Global Strategy highlighted the
connection between EU member states facing governmental, economic, and energy
fragility, and outlined the potential for disruption in such areas as important a
consideration as terrorism and hybrid threats.275 The need for a so-called “energy
development and transition” across the EU speaks to the vitality of energy policies, as
well as their inherent connection between supply security, and defense and foreign
policy.276
The outcome of Energiewende, therefore, will impact a variety of issues beyond
energy policy in Europe. If Energiewende can successfully transition into a low-carbon
economy, many wealthy European nations are likely to follow suit. Some analysts argue
that although at the outset this appears positive, the potential for such a large-scale
change in dependency could “profoundly alter global power relations.”277 However, if
Energiewende fails to prove the viability of a low-carbon economy across the EU, what
has at times been called “mutual dependencies” or “foreign dependencies” on Russian oil
and gas, will continue to abound.278 This too carries with it potential consequences for the
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EU. By continuing to rely upon Russia for oil and gas imports, EU member states,
particularly Central and Eastern European nations, face a distinct disadvantage in foreign
and defense policy flexibility vis-à-vis Russia. As recent years have shown, and as
encapsulated by the EU’s 2016 Global Strategy, the threat environment in Europe
includes newfound aggressions previously unseen since the Cold War.279 As broad
security and defense reviews in recent years have begun to reflect, the inherent
relationship between energy security, and supply security in particular, cannot escape
consequence in defense and foreign policy. Should Energiewende fail, the EU as a body
would face increasingly limited response options in light of newfound regional
instabilities and aggressions emanating from Moscow.

The Future of Energy Security in Europe
The future of energy security in the EU will depend upon the future of the Union
itself. The integration of Europe has been a shining success of the twenty-first century.
The EU has evolved over time to include twenty-eight nations. The Union has sought a
closer incorporation of markets in recent years, including its energy market. Over the
course of its existence, the EU has seen political and economic globalization that has at
times strengthened, and at times weakened the Union.280 As the EU continues to face
disagreements and membership debates, many have begun to wonder if the future of the
Union is in peril. Indeed, many scholars in recent years have begun analyzing the so-
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called “end” or “death” of Europe.281 This includes member states divergences regarding
immigration policies, foreign and defense policies, and the recent surge of populist
parties and movements across the continent.282 The EU has witnessed five major
challenges in particular since the unveiling of the Europe 2020 strategy. These include:
the UK June 2016 vote to leave the Union, the Greek debt crisis and Eurozone anxieties,
a resurgent Russia, the ongoing migrant and refugee crisis, and an increased threat of
terrorism.283 Within this framework of panic, energy security and policy occupies a quiet
concern. However, the success or failure of Germany’s Energiewende may hold the key
to the future of EU cohesion going forward.
If the EU as a whole can achieve its Union-wide decarbonization goals, it will be
due in large part to nuclear energy. The growth of renewables in Europe has been
dramatic in recent years. However, the continued use of coal, particularly lignite, in many
CEE states places the EU emission reduction goal at risk. Furthermore, many Eastern EU
nations simply do not possess the necessary capital to grow RES technology at the rate
which Germany has exemplified. Feed-in tariff mechanisms, and massive state subsidies
are not yet an option across the continent. Indeed, for every European state that has
denounced nuclear energy, a different nation has reinvested in its own nuclear energy
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programs. Currently, fourteen EU nations house operating nuclear reactors.284 Seven EU
member states are generally cited as pro-nuclear, or strong-nuclear states: France,
Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, and the UK.285
Conversely, the strongest opponents of nuclear energy in the EU include: Austria,
Germany, Greece, and Italy.286 Germany’s decision to pursue an energy transformation
without the aid of nuclear energy has been criticized by numerous EU member states that
have chosen to continue nuclear energy programs after the 2011 Fukushima accident. If
Energiewende proves it is unable to implement a successful energy transition without
nuclear energy, EU states that have also launched denuclearization policies and programs
may reconsider. Furthermore, anti-nuclear states seeking decarbonization policies, or
similar domestic energy transitions, may see a shift in public attitudes or national policies
regarding nuclear attitudes. States that continue to pursue decarbonization policies
without the aid of nuclear energy, in the wake of an Energiewende failure, are likely to
face continued or enhanced criticism from pro-nuclear EU member states. This, in turn,
would likely further the EU divide over the contentious nuclear energy debate.
In addition to a growing difference in nuclear energy attitudes, coal faces an
uncertain future in Europe. Coal has remained an essential component to the
industrialization of Europe over the centuries. Today, a total of nine EU countries do not
yet have a coal phase out plan under discussion: Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic,
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Greece, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, and Spain.287 Poland and Greece in
particular have been vocal against coal phase outs, as both nations refused to sign a 2017
EU initiative pledging no new coal-fired power plants after 2020.288 Following a potential
Energiewende failure, and particularly an emissions reduction goal failure, coal phase out
initiatives are less likely to thrive across the EU. Furthermore, member states that have
failed to initiate coal phase out plans are even more likely to maintain coal-powered
plants. One of the fundamental European trends Germany’s Energiewende relied upon
was the “beginning of the end for coal.”289 Both its emissions reduction goal as well as its
increased RES share goal envisioned a smaller role for coal in the EU going forward.
However, the anti-coal trend in various EU member states has yet to reflect energy
market realities as well as EU-wide attitudes. An impending Energiewende failure is
likely to see a renewed European debate on the future of coal. Such a debate, in turn, will
affect the future of coal phase out plans in a variety of EU member states, as well as procoal sentiments operating on the periphery of the EU, particularly in former Soviet bloc
states seeking alternatives to Russian LNG.
An Energiewende failure will also seal the fate of continued European reliance on
Russian gas. A resurgent Russia came to the forefront of EU concerns following the 2014
annexation of Crimea and occupation of eastern Ukraine. Some EU member states,
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particularly Western EU nations, maintain extensive economic ties to Russia, including
Germany and Italy.290 Many of these nations continue to rely upon Russia for oil and
natural gas, Germany in particular, due in part to the benefit of well-integrated regional
energy markets. Accordingly, in the wake of a resurgent Russia, many Western EU
member states have continued to express a cautious, yet continued reliance upon
Moscow. Germany’s Energiewende encompasses such a belief, as the energy transition
policy outlined a continued reliance upon Russian LNG until renewable energy can
reliably fill the gap. However, many former Soviet bloc states in Central and Eastern
Europe have expressed distrust and wariness at Russian dependence. Although Russia
continues to operate as the region’s key supplier of oil and natural gas, CEE gas markets
have notable differences than their Western counterparts. If the Energiewende fails,
Germany will face a seemingly unending dependence upon Russian LNG for the
conceivable future, particularly following any denuclearization reiteration in the wake of
an Energiewende failure. This, in turn, will signal to EU member states the likelihood of
prolonged regional dependence upon Moscow for natural gas. Such geopolitical realities
will be met with concern, particularly among former bloc states now member to the EU.
Although some European nations, including Germany, have sought to diversify
their energy sources through exploratory fracking and expanded LNG contracts with the
West, there remains compelling evidence of Russian interference with such attempts.
This interference includes, most notably, Russian support of anti-fracking movements
and protests that have crippled some CEE nations from breaking free of Russian gas
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dependency. In 2014, the New York Times reported of Russian support to the antifracking movement in Romania after the US energy company Chevron leased land in
Pungesti for exploratory drilling.291 Lithuania also suspected the Kremlin of fueling and
funding protest movements aimed at undermining a natural gas opening for the US in the
CEE region, seeking to maintain their geopolitical hold on the lucrative gas market. Two
years prior, in 2012, Bulgaria faced similar waves of anti-fracking protests following a
shale-gas license issued to Chevron.292 Although the Russian Federation has denied any
involvement in the protest movements, the Kremlin’s role in spearheading inorganic
protests movements aimed at preventing competitors from gaining a foothold in the gas
market has become a widely-accepted reality in European energy security.
In late 2014, NATO Secretary General Fogh Anders Rasmussen declared that,
“Russia, as part of their sophisticated information and disinformation operations, engaged
actively with so-called non-governmental organizations – environmental organizations
working against shale gas – to maintain dependence on imported Russian gas.”293
Similarly, a 2017 report issued by the U.S. Director of National Intelligence states that
the Russian state media channel, RT, “runs anti-fracking programming, highlighting
environmental issues and the impacts on public health.”294 The report continues to assert
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that such an effort is “likely reflective of the Russian Government’s concern about the
impact of fracking and US natural gas production on the global energy market and the
potential challenges to Gazprom’s profitability.”295 Thus, the problem of Russian-led
protest movements is indicative not only of the harsh geopolitical realities felt by
numerous CEE nations, but also of the associated problems with energy diversification in
the region, and the likelihood of continued Russian energy dominance.
Germany’s energy transition policy is both an expression of national ingenuity,
and international leadership. As such, the Energiewende will have widespread affects
upon Germany, and the EU as a whole. The European Union in particular will feel the
consequences of the energy transition policy, both in its successes and failures. As the EU
faces cohesion problems, the core Union principle of solidarity remains at risk. Following
the Greek debt crisis and migration concerns, analysts have begun to note “a high degree
of acrimony and a lack of trust among EU member states.”296 This is particularly
alarming in light of Germany’s impending target goal failures. The Energiewende policy
was unveiled as both a national strategy, and Germany’s attempt to lead the EU in energy
policy. If the energy transition proves to be a failure, Germany risks its standing in the
EU as a leading member state. Agora Energiewende, a German think tank supporting
Energiewende, published a 2017 study analyzing Germany’s likely emissions reduction
goal failure. The study concluded that, should Energiewende fail to meet its 2020 goals,
Germany is likely to suffer “irreparable damage to its international reputation as a climate
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protection frontrunner.”297 Furthermore, the shift between Western EU member states and
Central and Eastern EU member states is likely to grow following an Energiewende
failure. The energy divide in the EU has centered on Russian LNG reliance,
decarbonization and coal phase out plans, and denuclearization. Energiewende as a policy
encompasses nearly every EU concern since the unveiling of its first Union-wide
comprehensive energy policy.
The future of energy security in the EU will foremost be determined by the
outcome of Germany’s Energiewende. If the Energiewende can prove to be a successful
international model for clean energy independence, many wealthy EU member states are
likely to follow in its example. However, if the energy transition ultimately fails in its
goals, all EU member states will be forced to face unique geopolitical realities
surrounding energy policy and security. An Energiewende failure could also signal to the
rest of Europe the problems associated with rapid decarbonization policies. Such a signal
is likely to affect the EU push for low-carbon energy, as well as reinvigorate countries
that continue to favor coal, such as Poland and Greece. An Energiewende failure also
risks geopolitical consequences for the Union. If RES are unable to fill the gap left by
Russian gas, Germany will face a necessary and indefinite relationship with Moscow to
meet its energy needs. This could be seen as a provocative position in the EU, as many
former Soviet bloc states in the Union have remained wary of reliance upon Russia to
supplement their energy needs. If Energiewende is unable to propel Germany into energy
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independence, the EU faces vast future disagreements about the future of energy policy
and security within the Union. Such disagreements could risk the future of Union
cohesion going forward.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION: WHAT ENERGIEWENDE GOT RIGHT

While Germany’s Energiewende is likely to fail to meet its stated policy goals, the
energy transformation will undoubtedly render a variety of positive impacts upon the
future of renewable energy and technology. To begin, Germany has been able to disprove
the argument that renewable energy is too unreliable or unstable to generate large
portions of a country’s total electricity generation. Today, over 30% of Germany’s
electricity is generated from RES. This a remarkable feat for Germany and renewable
energy, particularly by global comparison. Renewable energy has grown 18% in a decade
inside Germany, and the decentralized model of the energy transition policy has seen
unmatched local involvement, citizen ownership, and public support. This ownership
structure has proven to the world the power of grassroots social movements, which
ultimately paved the way for Energiewende in Germany. Thus, the social implications
and possibilities of the energy transformation alone are worth noting for the future of
global energy and security.
Germany’s Energiewende has also shouldered the burden of cost, associated with
its “first mover wager.” This, in turn, has enabled the growth of RES technology and
made its proliferation increasingly more cost efficient for other countries. German
renewable energy subsidy costs have absorbed much of the production expense burdens,
particularly with solar photovoltaic (PV) energy. Energiewende, therefore, has enabled
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more cost-efficient RES proliferation in countries including China and the US.298 The
energy transition policy has also paved the way forward in renewable energy innovation.
New technologies, such as renewable jet fuel, and the expansion of previously less
popular RES infrastructure, such as offshore wind farming, have seen recent growth and
optimism.299 This leads to the conclusion that what Energiewende may lack in terms of
policy goal success, it can perhaps make up for in the longevity of international attitude
changes regarding the future of renewable energy. Put simply, where Energiewende may
fail in policy goal implementation, it is likely to succeed in generating a global era of
renewable energy possibility. Thus, the positive impact of Germany’s Energiewende may
be one of hope for a new future, apart from any policy goal failure.

New Milestones
Although Energiewende is unlikely to meet its greenhouse gas emission level
reduction goal for 2020, Germany has still witnessed a profound change in overall
emission levels since 1990. Between 1990 and 2016, Germany experienced an overall
28% decline in greenhouse gas emissions.300 This decline amounts to the difference
between an annual total of 1.25 billion tons of CO2 emitted in 1990, to 906 million tons
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in 2016.301 Such a reduction is a remarkable environmental achievement for Germany,
particularly in light of the country’s continued status as a major industrial nation and
economy. Regardless of Germany’s likely failure to meet its 2020 target goal of a 40%
emissions level reduction, Energiewende has positively contributed to notable greenhouse
gas emissions decline since the launch of the policy. In addition to greenhouse gas
emissions decline, Germany has recently reached new milestones for renewable energy.
One sunny and gusty day in May 2017, a record-breaking 85% of Germany’s total energy
from renewables.302 Although this success has not been consistent, it does reveal the
possibility of large-scale RES dependency, and the potential diminished need for coal and
nuclear energy. Furthermore, the continued success of renewables share in electricity
generation in the winter has caused an upsurge of optimism for the future. Most experts
have expressed belief that large percentages of power use from renewables would occur
on windy, spring days, as the May 2017 record exemplifies. However, data from January
2018 reveals the possibility of record highs in the winter months as well. This, in turn,
has caused some scientists to declare that Germany is entering into a “new phase of
renewables.”303
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The Rise of New Technologies
In addition to continued growth of RES share in power usage, Energiewende has
also given rise to a host of new renewable technologies. Among the most cited examples
of RES technology growth stemming from Energiewende is offshore wind farming. The
launch of the German energy transition policy in 2010 envisioned a large growth in wind
farming, particularly offshore wind. Since then, offshore wind power in Europe has risen
to a prominent place in energy production. In 2015, over 3,000 megawatts (MW) of
offshore wind power was connected to European grids.304 While still the majority of this
wind power resides in Germany, both the UK and Netherlands have begun to rival the
energy transition leader. In 2015, Britain connected a total of 556 MW of offshore wind
to the grid, while the Netherlands connected 180 MW.305 Furthermore, the total amount
of offshore wind investment in Europe reached 13.3 billion euros in 2015, doubling 2014
total investments.306 Just as Energiewende outlined, the offshore wind energy industry is
growing globally. Over 100 offshore wind turbines, with a projected 626 MW capacity,
were installed in Germany in the first half of 2017.307 Meanwhile, European wind turbine
orders were up 75% in 2016.308 Such data is indicative of not only increases in domestic
German offshore wind capability, but an increase in continental growth of offshore wind.
Even China has reached new RES heights in the wake of Germany’s energy transition.
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The People’s Republic installed an estimated 29,000 MW of offshore wind capability in
2015.309 While Energiewende is not solely responsible for this global trend in RES
development, Germany’s energy transformation can be seen as the pioneer of large-scale
offshore wind farming, which has begun to bloom across Europe.
In addition to increasing existing renewable technology, Energiewende has also
encouraged research and development into future RES technologies. Following the
successes Germany has experienced regarding the expansion of renewable, RES has seen
a growth in promising new technologies. Such technologies include new solar thermal
storage solutions, floating wind turbines, biomass gasification techniques, tidal energy,
and renewable jet fuel.310 The search for new solar storage solutions in particular is born
from the successes of Energiewende and solar PV energy. Germany’s energy transition
policy oversaw the subsidy cost which has enabled solar power, and particularly solar or
photovoltaic panels, to be cheaper now than at any other moment in history. 311 However,
unlike many other energy sources, storage for solar is especially difficult and costly due
to fluctuations in supply being weather-dependent. Although Germany has been able to
dispel the former notion that RES could only supply a small share of the electric grid due
to intermittency, a storage capability for solar energy is needed to ensure a stable and
steady supply of energy.312 Thus, since Energiewende has proven large shares of the
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electricity grid can be generated through renewable energy sources, the next problem to
solve is storage. Furthermore, such research and development into new renewable
storage, such as molten salt storage technology, has been deemed a less perilous
investment following the success of Germany’s wind and solar energy proliferation.
Although Energiewende has not sought to revolutionize the transportation sector –
a commonly cited flaw of the policy – Elon Musk and the advent of the Tesla and
SpaceX, as well as continued development of renewable jet fuel, have all followed in the
wake of the German energy transformation. The transportation industry worldwide is
among the largest global contributors to greenhouse gas emissions.313 Although most
energy policies today focus on energy and industrial activity, including Energiewende,
global greenhouse gas emission levels will continue to rise until transitions can be made
to low-carbon transport options.314 Presently, inventions such as the Tesla and renewable
jet fuel, are aimed at transforming the transportation sector in order to move away from
traditional, carbon-emitting transport infrastructure. Renewable jet fuel in particular
could have implications for both civilian and military transportation emissions. Although
such research and development achievements in the transportation sector are not
explicitly linked to Germany’s Energiewende and its outlined goals, the energy transition
policy undoubtedly led to increased fervor and possibility in RES research and
development. Furthermore, when taken together, the milestones of Energiewende,
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combined with low-carbon milestones in the transportation sector, carries with it the
potential for a true global energy and climate change transformation.

Cost and the Second Mover
One of the most successful and controversial components of the German
Energiewende was the advent of the feed-in-tariff system. Under the feed-in tariff, or FiT,
fixed prices for renewable technology were guaranteed, generally for 20 years, in order to
encourage RES investment with minimal risk.315 In order to raise the funds to pay for the
guaranteed fixed prices, a surcharge was placed on all German electric bills, known as the
EEG.316 This, in turn, became known as Germany’s “first mover wager” regarding
renewable energy. Years of subsidized support for renewables would pay off, many
believed, as RES technology and investment began to proliferate globally. Once this
occurred, Germany will have gained a sizeable portion of the global market in
renewables, by being the first large investor.317 The proliferation of RES technology, it
was reasoned, would occur once Germany’s first mover investment had seen the lowered
cost of renewables. In turn, Germany’s first mover investment in renewable energy
sources and technology has paved the way for the second mover, or movers. One of the
central issues of renewable energy and energy policy innovation is the “free rider
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problem.” William Nordhaus, a Yale economist who has focused on climate change
outlined the free rider problem, as well as Germany’s solution to it. He writes, “Because
[climate change] is a global problem, and doing something is costly, every country has an
incentive to do nothing and hope others will act. Germany has behaved differently… And
in doing so, it has made the journey easier for the rest of us.”318
The second mover phenomenon in RES technology has begun to occur,
remarkably, without the aid of feed-in tariff systems. Presently, other countries are
beginning to introduce renewables into energy portfolios without the need of public
subsidies.319 The best example of Germany’s first mover wager, and the associated
second mover opportunity can be found in solar photovoltaic technology and energy.
When Germany introduced the feed-in-tariff system, both solar and wind power costs far
outweighed those of hydrocarbons. In 2000, the price of a photovoltaic module, or solar
panel, was 5 euros per watt.320 Between 2006 and 2014, following a boom in the German
solar energy industry and local demand, the installed cost of PV modules fell an at annual
average rate of 13%.321 By 2015, the cost of a solar panel was less than 0.70 euros per
watt.322
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As a result of the German solar energy boom, the market price of solar PV
technology is the lowest it has ever been. As of 2017, the levelized cost of solar PV
electricity was cheaper than most fossil fuel sources. Incredibly, solar electricity was
even cheaper than natural gas in some places.323 Accordingly, the global drop in solar
photovoltaic panel prices has been dubbed “Germany’s gift to the world.”324 Thus, the
result of affordable solar technology and its proliferation is unquestionably linked to
Energiewende, which led to the solar PV boom, resulting in affordable RES technology
for second movers today.

Energiewende as a Social Movement
In addition to its first mover achievement, Germany’s Energiewende has also
been heralded as a governmental policy born from local, grassroots movements. Belgian
theorist Michel Bauwens has argued there are two different ways in which to analyze
Energiewende. One is purely technical, while the other is social and political. From a
technical perspective, Bauwens argues, Energiewende is somewhat unexceptional.
Bauwens cites Denmark, Uruguay, and Costa Rica as all producing a larger percentage of
electricity from renewables than Germany presently does.325 However, from a social and
political perspective, Bauwens argues, Energiewende is an immense accomplishment. He
writes,
“[When] looked at from a more social and political angle, the Energiewende is an
enormous success for social movements, for people power changing the world from
323
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below, in a policy-field – power politics as it were – that has traditionally been one of the
key areas of governmental control. The struggle [of Energiewende] has meant that more
and more people in Germany are regaining at least some control over their energy
futures… it is precisely for this reason that the term energy democracy has emerged to
describe and even internationalize this process.”326
Bauwen’s argues that the grassroots support that allowed for Energiewende and its
investment success is an extension of 1960s era social movements that sought to bring
about the “new world.”327 The German Anti-Nuclear movement in particular is
emblematic of such environmental social movements. What makes Energiewende unique
as a social movement, however, is the way in which the movement has survived the
institutionalization process.
According to social movement theory, organized grassroots movements are often
forced to institutionalize, in order to cement movement gains.328 However,
institutionalization often causes movements to fail. The success of surviving the
institutionalization process, therefore, is where Energiewende is unique. Bauwen argues
through a combination of “local movement processes and national legislation, and an
unusual combination of political and economic logics,” Energiewende has been able to
withstand the institutionalization process, and continue to make gains.329 One of the
instrumental successes of Energiewende and its ability to survive the institutionalization
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process was the establishment of citizen’s cooperatives. Just three years after the energy
transition policy launch, the extent of local RES ownership and citizen’s cooperatives
was evident. In 2013, Germany housed 888 energy cooperatives, comprised of 130,000
people, and amounted to 1.2 billion invested euros.330 Put simply, the ability of
Energiewende to succeed as a social movement has a direct relationship with the initial
grassroots optimism for green energy in Germany, and the subsequent formation of
citizen’s cooperatives for RES investment and production. In this way, Energiewende has
been a tremendous success in pioneering a “people’s energy revolution” that is the first
ever bottom-up energy revolution. In this way, Bauwen argues, Energiewende is the
decades long realization of European social movements that have sought to bring together
“local coops and rural communities where people work together on practical projects in
ways that transcend ideological and social boundaries, where an increase in autonomy
and sovereignty means that local value creation, too, is increased.”331

The Prospect of Possibility
Alongside Energiewende’s success as a social movement, the energy transition
has engineered possibility for a new low carbon future. The German energy
transformation has sought to model the future of energy production and consumption, as
one of hope and hard work. Although the outlined policy goals of Energiewende have
been more fraught than was previously assumed, Germany’s daring energy experiment
has shown that the future of RES and clean energy is closer than was previously thought.
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As journalist Robert Kunzig writes, “They [the Germans] knew Energiewende was never
going to be a walk in the forest, and yet they set out on it. What can we learn from
them?”332 For the time being, it appears Energiewende has not proven to be an affordable
energy policy model for all of Europe – particularly less economically prosperous Central
and Eastern European states. However, one of the likely long-lasting impacts of
Germany’s Energiewende will be the power of innovation, and the importance of longterm vision. Although Germany is not on track to meet its 2020 policy goals, the country
is far ahead of the EU goal schedule.333 Furthermore, the German clean energy trend
appears to be catching on in several European countries. Denmark has seen its green
power generation rise to 43% in 2015.334 In 2011, Italy added a record-breaking 9.3
gigawatt of renewable energy onto its grid system, and has increased its green power
share of electricity to over 17% at the end of 2017.335 Spain, meanwhile, has expanded its
solar and wind power production over 15%.336 While Energiewende may not be an
affordable clean energy transition model for all of Europe, its legacy of forward-thinking
policy and investment in the future has already begun to positively impact European
energy policies centered on a sustainable future.
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Additionally, Germany’s Energiewende has turned the correlation between policy
and markets on its head, revealing how policies can shape markets, contrary to the former
thought that only markets should shape policy. Germany embarked on its energy
transition at a time when RES technology was still costly, and markets overwhelmingly
favored fossil fuels. By adopting an energy policy that favored renewables at a time when
markets favored hydrocarbons, Germany has been able to engineer the RES market
through its first mover cost burden. Since the adoption of the feed-in tariff system that
allowed for large-scale renewable investment in 2000, Germany has given rise to an
entirely new RES market. Both solar and wind power compete with traditional carbonbased energy sources, at affordable investment prices. In just fifteen short years, the
German Energiewende has been able to alter what was once a niche market into a
mainstream one. Thus, another key dimension of the Energiewende’s success is a
political one: policymaking. Although the stated policy goals on Energiewende remain
problematic for the short-term and long-term future, the mass investment and subsequent
widespread proliferation of now affordable RES technology has given rise to a renewable
market success. Through its first mover wager, Germany has been able to prove how
governmental policy can affect markets. This construct has been Germany’s answer to
the debate over the relationship between policy and markets. Energiewende, it appears,
has successfully shown how a governmental policy can steer an international market.

Conclusion
Energiewende will go down in history with a complex legacy. Many of the
expressed policy aims of the energy transition will not be met. These include the 2020
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goals of a 40% greenhouse gas emission reduction as well as a 20% reduction in energy
consumption. Such short-term policy failures are connected to the rising cost of
renewables disproportionally put onto the German public, as well as the continued use of
lignite and coal, and the necessary and looming electricity grid modernizations.
Furthermore, such short-term goal failures are likely to make both intermediate and longterm goals of the policy even more difficult to meet. Public support is likely to wane in
upcoming years, making the necessary infrastructure development for intermediate and
long-term goals less feasible. Furthermore, changes in the ownership structure of RES,
particularly the shift away from citizen’s cooperatives through the adoption of an auctionbased system, risk alienating the base of public support that has thus far enabled the
energy transition. If Energiewende fails to meet its target goals, the policy jeopardizes its
ability to prove the viability of the renewable energy project, as well as the likelihood that
such a policy could be adopted by the European Union. As the de facto leader of the EU,
Germany’s potential energy policy failure could risk the country’s international
credibility and capability of steering EU policy in the future. Moreover, an Energiewende
failure is likely to divide the EU member states even further on issues of foreign
dependency, nuclear energy, and decarbonization. Such a fractured debate, in turn, risks
further dividing the EU at a time of momentous instability in the Union. Put simply, an
Energiewende policy failure would have vast implications for German energy policy, and
EU energy policy cohesion going forward and into the future.
Although the policy failure implications of Energiewende are great, Germany’s
energy transition also yields tremendous lessons and positive implications for the global
future of energy. Thus far, Germany has been able to dispel the former argument that
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renewables were too unreliable and unstable to generate sizeable portions of electricity.
The burden of cost put upon German citizens through the renewable electricity surcharge
has enabled RES technology to proliferate at historically low prices throughout Europe
and beyond. For the first time in history, solar and wind power are beginning to outpace
hydrocarbons in affordability. Countries in Europe, as well as China and the US, have
begun to adopt renewable energy at increased rates, due in part to the RES first mover
costs Germany absorbed for nearly twenty years. The Energiewende has also shown the
power of grassroots organizations and social movements, as the energy transition was
born, foremost, from local activism including the Anti-Nuclear movement and the
German environmental party, known as the Greens. Germany’s energy transition
originated in homegrown investment and RES ownership through the growth and
expansion of citizen’s cooperatives and local and state-wide policy initiatives. Yet the
greatest success of Energiewende has been the ability of the energy policy to project
possibility, and the hope of a low carbon future.
By taking on the most dramatic energy policy designed to combat climate change,
Germany has sought to lead the world in clean energy independence. Regardless of the
policy outcome, many of the trends Energiewende sought to introduce are likely to
remain. These include: expanded solar and wind energy markets, increased RES demand,
storage solution research and development, and local grassroots renewable energy
generation and investment. Indeed, such trends have already begun to flourish across
Europe, China, and the US. By adopting an energy transformation policy, Germany took
on the role as first mover both financially and morally. German policymakers harnessed
the aspirations that have surrounded nearly two decades of EU energy aims, and crafted a
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domestic energy policy that sought to look farther to the future than any policy before it.
The forward-thinking approach, so characteristically German in nature, has taken the first
step toward a decarbonized, decentralized, diverse energy future. This has been the
German gift to the world, and this is the gift of Energiewende.
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